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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction in the Court of Appeals is conferred by virtue of Section
-7&*2a 3 (g), Utah Code Annotated.

1953. as amended.
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BRIEF OF APPELLANT

NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from a final Decree of Divorce of the Third Judicial
District Court entered on September 10, 1990.
No Cross-Appeal has been filed.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The issues presented by this appeal are:
1.

Is the evidence sufficient to support Findings of Fact #4 made

by the District Court and did the trial court error in awarding a mutual
Decree of Divorce, (A-22), upon grounds of irreconcilable differences when
the evidence indicated that the wife could have the Decree of Divorce, (A22), awarded to her from the husband upon many grounds, such as acts,
declarations, and conduct conjunctively constituting extreme mental and

physical cruelty, desertion, gross neglect of duty, extremely argumentative,
extremely authoritarian conduct, violent and ungovernable temper, bodily
acts, violent and threatening conduct, harsh, humiliating demeanor,
incompatibility with conflicts in personalities and disposition so deep as to
be irreconcilable and to render it impossible for the parties to continue
normal marital relationship?
2.

Is the evidence sufficient to support Findings of Facts #7, #8

and #9 made by the District Court and did the trial court error in the
amount awarded under the provisions of the Uniform Child Support
Schedules for two children in light of the true incomes of both parties?
3.

Did the trial court err in refusing to take judicial notice of the

evidence submitted at the hearing and in not awarding alimony to the wife
thereby erroneously failing to maintain the wife's standard of living and in
not addressing the wife's ability to support herself or provide the
necessary financial facts to support the no alimony award and in refusing
to consider such evidence in arriving at its judgment?
4.

Did the trial court err in refusing to take into consideration all

the mutual property of the parties including the second home and in not
giving the wife an interest therein, and in not dividing all mutual property,
Facts #11, #12, #13 and #14 in a more equitable manner and in failing to
enter Findings of Facts to support Fact #14 in the division of property,
awarding only the sum of Three Thousand Dollars from the proceeds of the
sale of one home as total settlement of marital property and the return of
property over which plaintiff had lost control?
5.

Did the trial court err in ordering that each party shall pay

their separate costs and fees and refusing to take judicial notice of the
evidence presented in not considering under Utah law, (1) the
2

reasonableness of the fee; (2) the need of the party to have his or her fee
paid or contributed to; and (3) the ability of the party from whom the fee
is being requested to contribute to or pay an attorney's fee award?
6.

Was the denial of the plaintiffs interest in and pertaining to

Respondents benefit plans, retirement plans, savings, stock plans or other
benefit plan whatsoever an error in law?
7.

Did the trial court err in placing undue emphasis on the quick

sale of one of the parties' homes and not the other and was there an error
in law in ordering plaintiff to move quickly from her home and forcing its
sale at an unreasonable low price and in failing to consider all other factors
in the court's
8.

determination?

Did the conduct of the trial court constitute judicial bias?
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES

The statutes relied upon by the Plaintiff are:

Statutes
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

Section 30-3-3, Utah Code Annotated.. (1984), as amended.
Section 30-3-5, Utah Code Annotated. 1953, as amended.
Section 30-3-6, Utah Code Annotated. 1953, as amended.
Section 30-3-7, Utah Code Annotated. 1953, as amended.
Section 30-3-10, Utah Code Annotated. 1953, as amended.
Section 30-3-10.6, Utah Code Annotated. 1953, as amended.
Section 30-4-1, Utah Code Annotated. 1953, as amended.
Section 30-4-3, Utah Code Annotated. 1953, as amended.
Section 30-6-2, Utah Code Annotated. 1953, as amended.
Section 30-6-4, Utah Code Annotated. 1953, as amended.
Section 62A-4-502, Utah Code Annotated. 1953, as amended.
Section 78-2a-3 (g), Utah Code Annotated. 1953, as amended.
United

13.

States

Section 1, 14th Amendment.
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Constitution

Rules
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Rule 52, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Rule 201 (d), (f), Utah Rules of Evidence.
Rule 701, Utah Rules of Evidence.
Rule 702, Utah Rules of Evidence.
Rule 901, Utah Rules of Evidence.
Cases

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45
46.
47.
48.

Fletcher v. Fletcher. 615 P.2d 1218 (Utah 1980).
Gramme v. Gramme. 587 P.2d 144 (Utah 1978).
Paffel v. Paffel. 732 P.2d 96, 436 (Utah 1986).
Saint v. Saint. 411 P.2d 683, 196 Kan. 330 (Kan. 1966).
Gardner v. Gardner. 512 P.2d 84, 85 N.M. 324 (N.M. 1973).
Fite v. Fite. 479 P.2d 560, 3 Wash.App.726 (Wash.App. 1970).
McCov v. McCov. 429 P.2d 999 (Okl. 1967).
Countryman v. Countryman. 659 P.2d 663, 135 Ariz. 110.
Christopher v. Christopher. 381 P.2d 115, 62 Wash.2d 82.
(Wash. 1963)
Brammer v. Brammer. 471 P.2d 58, 93 Idaho (Idaho 1970).
Hofer v. Hofer. 427 P.2d 411, 247 Or. 82 (Or. 1967).
Barrett v. Barrett. 403 P.2d 649, 17 Utah 2dl (Utah 1965).
Laws v. Laws. 432 P.2d 632, 164 Colo. 80 (Colo. 1967).
Montague v. Montague. 510 P.2d 901 (Colo.App. 1973).
Foutch v.Foutch. 469 P.2d 2333, 2 Wash. App. 407.
(Wash.App 1970)
Kelso v. Kelso. 448 P.2d 499, 75 Wash.2d, 24 (Wash. 1968).
Wick v. Wick. 489 P.2d 19, 107 Ariz.382 (Ariz. 1971).
Hurn v. Hurn. 541 P.2d 360 (Alaska 1975).
Matter of Marriage of Clapperton 649 P.2d 620, 58 Or.App. 577
(Or.App. 1982).
Wanberg v. Wanberg. 664 P.2d 568 (Alaska 1983).
Christiansen v. Christiansen. 667 P.2d 592 (Utah 1983).
Nesmith v. Nesmith. 540 P.2d 1229, 112 Ariz. 248 (Ariz. 1975).
In re Marriage of Manzo. 659 P.2d 669 (Colo. 1983).
Naranjo v. Naranjo. 751 P.2d 1144 (Utah App. 1988).
Ruhsam v. Ruhsam. 742 P.2d 123 (Utah App. 1987).
Wiese v. Wiese. 699 P.2d 700 (Utah 1985).
Fischer v. Fischer. 443 P.2d 463, 92 Idaho 379 (Idaho 1968).
Hansen v..Hansen. 537 P.2d 491 (Utah 1975).
Carter v. Carter. 379 P.2d 311, 191 Kan.
Despain v. Despain. 610 P.2d 1303 (Utah 1980).
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49.
50.
51.
52.
53
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60

Dehm v. Dehm. 5545 P.2d 525 (Utah 1976)
Olson v. Olson. 704 P.2d 564 (Utah 1985)
Newmever v. Newmever. 745 P.2d 276 (Utah 1987).
Jones v. Jones.. 700 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985).
Jones v. Jones 700 P.2d 1075 (Utah 1985).
Canning v. Canning. 744 P.2d 325 (Utah App. 1987).
Schindler v. Schindler. 776 P.2d 84 (Utah App. 1989).
Rashand v. Rasband. 752 P.2d 1331 (Utah App. 1988)
English v. English. 565 P.2d 409 (Utah 1977).
Talley v. Tallev. 739 P.2d 83 (Utah App. 1987).
Bushell v. Bushell. 649 P.2d 85 (Utah 1982).
Haslam v. Morrison. 113 Utah 14, 190 P.2d 520. 523 (1948).

61

Heltman v. Heltman. 511 P.2d 720 (Utah 1973).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This is a divorce case. Appellant, Rita C. Gum, and Respondent, James
Richard Gum, were married in March 1982 and continued their state of
matrimony for over eight (8) years.
Before James and Rita were married she asked him if she should
work and help support her girls. He said, "No you'll have enough to do to
stay home and take care of me and the girls".
At their wedding Rita was very much in love with her new husband.
She had been married twice before, having two children with her
first husband, a boy and girl, and four girls with her second.
marriage and family.

She enjoyed

She had always worked hard to create a happy home

and was a good and faithful wife, still both her marriages had ended in
divorce.
She knew —that this time she had found the right husband for her,
he had two sons, and she anticipated a long and happy marriage.
But, subsequent to their marriage, the parties have had a very
stormy relationship; have been separated numerous times.

5

Trouble started on their Honeymoon when a sore appeared on her
husband's penis.

This caused them both concern, because it looked like a

venereal infection.
but James had not.

Rita had had a health examination before the wedding
Rita felt hurt and wanted to have the marriage

annulled, but James talked her out of the idea.

They abstained from

sexual intercourse until the sore disappeared; which it did during the
Honeymoon —then she also discovered he was semi-impotent.
On their return home James went to an urologist for an examination
and reported to Rita, that the Doctor said that he had an yeast infection.
This allied Rita's fears as to how serious the venereal infection may be
until she had a sore appear on her vagina several months later.
Shortly after returning home from their Honeymoon new trouble
developed over James' twenty eight (28) year old son of a previous
marriage Jim, who was living with his father.
problems.

Jim had deep physiological

Previous to the marriage Rita had suggested to James that he

should get physiological help for Jim; who had left two suicidal notes.
They had agreed before the marriage that Jim would move after a
short time.

Rita didn't realize the extent of Jim's problems.

allowed to stay for more than nine months.

Jim was

He was strongly dependent on

his father, did not work, pay rent or contribute to his care.
Rita gave her old car (American Rebel) to Jim. Jim was angry with
his father for marrying Rita and smashed the car into the curb in a fit of
anger.

The car was totaled, and had to be junked.
James and Jim didn't talk to each other. Jim would talk to Rita and

cry about his problems with his father.
did her adult son Tommy.

Rita treated him with love, as she

She became his support system, helped him get

6

back self esteem and confidence, until he was able to gain employment and
move out on his own.
In 1987 James and Rita bought a second house at 5685 South 3650
West, Bennion, Utah 84118; mortgaging it through Western Mortgage Loan
Corporation, (A-31).

They rented this house to Jim.

covered the mortgage payments.

The rental agreement

Rita was also able to get Jim and

James's relationship on civil grounds again.

Before moving Jim told Rita,

"When I move out my father will take his frustrations out on you —he
won't have me to take them out on anymore."

This happened, James took

his frustrations out on Rita; and also on the children.
When James returned from work, in the evenings he would isolate
himself in the main bedroom.

This continued for approximately two years.

While at home he wouldn't take any responsibility for disciplining the
girls.

Matter of fact he would hardly talk to them.
Rita helped them with their homework and attended school

conferences and etc.

She would take them to the dentist.

James wouldn't

let her take them to the doctor for examinations.
James would watch television and read the newspaper or a magazine
in the bedroom. Rita had to go in to talk to him. He only came out to eat
or go to work.
wife Pauline.

She figured that he must be depressed over his deceased
She asked, "When are you going to start being married to me

and stop living in the past?"
She visited Bishop Hunter, her L.D.S. bishop. He was the director of
psychology at Primary Children's Hospital.
was wrong with her.
start being a husband.

She told him that something

She couldn't wake her husband up to being alive and
She told Bishop Hunter that my husband was a

loner and wanted to be by himself.

Because he stayed away from his
7

family I would stay in the bedroom with him. He asked me to try and get
James to come with me and talk to him. James and Rita went to Bishop
Hunter for counseling.

James stopped going.

He wanted Rita to change and

declared that nothing was wrong with him, she would have to change.
He would be upset with her and nice to the children.

When he was

upset with the children he was nice to Rita. He couldn't be nice to
everyone at the same time.

He could love only one person at a time.

James wanted to adopt the four minor children, but there was
trouble getting the consent of Rita's former husband, Joseph Blaine Bailey.
Blaine owed Rita over Forty Thousand Dollars ($40,000), with interest, in
back child support.

So a deal was made. To gain Blaine's permission for

the adoption, James had Rita sign a statement forgiving her former
husband of all back and future child support. James would "make it up to
the girls and treat them as his own" he said.
So James adopted Rita's four younger children (A-66).
James appeared to be happy with his new family of four young
daughters.

He had two (2) adult sons from his previous marriage.

But

before the adoption he would pit Susan against Cynthia by being nice to
one and then the other, by rejecting one or accepting one and putting the
other down.
One time he made their handicapped child, Susan, walk 7 miles from
4500 South to 13th Ave; on the north side of the city. He said, "she got
herself out there and she could get herself home." If Rita went to pick her
up they would have had a big fight.

She tried to avoid fights as they

would go on for days, sometimes for weeks.
Susan had blisters on her little feet and Rita cried.

She wanted to

leave James then, but where could she go with four children?
8

Rita had helped James fix up the home where he had lived since his
first wife's death, but it was still too small for their large growing family.
James had a good job with Union Pacific, earning an annual income of
over Seventy Five Thousand Dollars ($75,000),
a good retirement.

and was looking forward to

James wanted to remodel and make their home larger.

Rita thought it would cost less if they sold the home and built or bought
another, but James wanted to stay where they were.

He and Rita signed a

note with the Associated Title Company on June 29, 1984

(A-30)

They paid off the old mortgage and proceeded with the remodeling.
There were disagreements between them over the remodeling.

The

costs escalated, they took a second mortgage with Western Mortgage Loan
Corporation and a third with Lincoln Service Corporation.
He still picked on Susan, their oldest child. She had to get a job when
she was sixteen to buy clothes, because he wouldn't buy any for her. He
abused her once by throwing her to the floor and putting his knee in her
crouch, pressing on her stomach so she couldn't breath. Susan didn't tell
her mother about this until some time later.
Rita tried hard for over eight years to make the marriage work, in
spite of James' violent temper.

Early in the marriage when he thought the

children were too noisy at the dinning table he had a temper fit, throwing
milk over the table and food.

Another time when he was making ice-

cream he poured sugar and eggs on Rita's head because she wouldn't find a
measuring cup for him.

This happened in the presence of their daughter

Amy.
After about 4 to 5 years of visiting his deceased wife's grave with
him to clean and put flowers on it, she refused to go, telling him that it was
something she felt he should do alone.
9

He then abused her physically by

dragging her from the kitchen to a living room chair, beating her with his
fists making bruises on her neck and forehead, while their two younger
children, Amy and Joy, watched. In this instance Rita called the Police.
One cold winter evening around midnight, in a fit of anger, he pushed
Rita out of their car with his foot at about 4th South and 5th East in Salt
Lake City. He left her on the street to walk home in the cold as she had no
money to make a phone call.

She walked until she found a restaurant

open, borrowed a dime and called Pamela, her oldest daughter, who came
and took her home.

James was sleeping when they arrived home.

James would abuse Rita by putting her down while comparing her to
his women friends and his deceased wife Pauline.

He told Rita she "wasn't

worth a pimple on Pauline's ass, you will never hold a candle to her."
He thought Rita was jealous of his women friends and Pauline.

She

wasn't at all, it was just the way that he compared her to them in an
abusive way.
James had open heart surgery.

That night he telephoned Rita about

2 a.m. and told her, "I love you very much, I have been mean to you and
the girls.

I'm sorry —will you forgive me? Considering everything I love

the girls too —tell them so."

If he came out of this OK he would change

and make it all up to us. He now admitted that that he was abusive to Rita
and the girls.

But he forgot all about it, when he recovered, and went back

to his same old ways.
After his operation his temper, frustration and paranoia got worse.
He came at Rita with a golf club which he had hid under the bed to protect
himself.

From what?

In the scuffle he broke her little toe.

Their daughter Cynthia pulled

him off of Rita. She went to Dr. Maddock who x-rayed her toe. Dr.
10

Maddock called the Y.M.C.A; making arrangements for Rita and the girls to
stay there until he could have James admitted to the hospital to get his
diabetics regulated. Rita and the girls stayed at the Y.M.C.A. for two weeks.
A social worker interviewed Rita.
she didn't

They wanted her to press charges, but

(A-33).

Rita went home when Dr. Maddock couldn't get James to go to the
hospital.

Then too, her mother was flying out for a visit.

James had Rita served for divorce while her mother was visiting.
He dropped the suit —saying he would go with her to counseling.
They went to Janice Nelsen, psychologist.

When she found fault with

James he wouldn't go anymore.
James became more violent in his attacks on Rita. He put his hands
around her neck shaking her head leaning her across the dresser and
screaming "I wish I could kill you." Susan was watching in horror and
shouting "please let mom go. dad!"
Rita didn't know what they were fighting about.
her with another divorce trial.

James threatened

She tried to stop him from leaving the

house, standing in front of the bedroom door. He left to go to his lawyer.
Rita went with Susan, to protective services, and filed a complaint for
spouse abuse.

She received a protective order, (A-37), and had James

removed from their home for Sixty (60) days.

He moved into their home

in Bennion.
James had Rita served the second time for divorce.
James knew Rita didn't want to go through another divorce, so he
used the judicial system to emotionally blackmail, coerce, frighten and
control her into getting his way.

1 1

Rita wanted to visit her mother in the east.

James said before he

would let her go she would have to put Susan out of their home. He said
he didn't like her: saying, "I will not live with her while you are gone. I
will not let you have the money to visit your mother unless she is out of

my house."
Rita hadn't been east to visit for 20 years, so she moved Susan to an
apartment close by, and brought her home when James moved out.
James kicked their second to oldest daughter Cynthia out before her
18th birthday: because she wouldn't finish high school.
say anything.

Rita didn't dare

James made all the decisions in the home.

Cynthia moved in with Susan, her sister, who lived in a dreary
apartment on 7th South & 5th East.

Rita later moved them into a better

neighborhood; 243 South 600 East.
James caused Rita more work and worry because of his demands and
selfishness.
He knew that she didn't want a divorce.
wanted a divorce either.

She didn't think he really

His actions were just another form of abuse.

She

wanted to get away from his abuse but she didn't have anyplace to go or
the financial means to move and support their four daughters.
After filing for divorce the second time, to coerce Rita to do his will,
he dropped the case.

He came home promising to get marriage counseling.

Rita found a psychologist, Gilbert L. Meier, at the University of Utah
to help them.

He gave them family and private counseling.

wouldn't talk about himself —it was always Rita's fault.
he treated the children badly, to get back at Rita.
and seemed to enjoy hurting them all.
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James

He did admit that

He wanted to hurt her

Most of their big fights were over the way he disciplined the
children.
He shouted through-out his marriage " I want you out of my life, I
wish I had never met you, I hate your guts." He verbally abused Rita,
calling her a bitch or slut through-out most of their marriage.
He wouldn't talk to the girls for days at a time and would ground
them for weeks. He would lock them out in the cold or beat them with a
belt; putting bruises and whelps on them.
rooms without dinner.

Then make them stay in their

When he wasn't emotionally or physically abusing

them he would just give them dirty looks or ignore them.
The girls finely gave up on their new adopted father.

They knew no

way to get close to him and show their love. But, they did know they had
to be exceptionally good to get him to love them. Their real father had
rejected them, now their adopted father was doing the same.
He told Rita that if the girls were to get clothes that she would have
to get a job and buy them. If she wanted a car she would have to purchase
it with her wages.
She would drive him to work in the mornings and picked him up
evenings; so that she would have the car to run errands during the day.
James was always in chaos and no.one could have any peace. He
never told the children he loved them; never praised them. He told Rita
"the children are just like you.

You have made brats out of them and they

are going to be just like you when they grow up." Rita thought, whatever
that meant.

Was it because neither Rita or the children would take abuse

without fighting back?
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In the two separate divorce actions James filed against Rita, one case
was filed March 26, 1987 and the complaint was amended October 12,
1988.

The second complaint he filed October 31, 1988.
During this second complaint James moved again into their second

home in Bennion, (A-31), staying for five months. He gave Rita no money
for expenses or child support. She had to seek help from H.E.A.T. to pay
her utilities.
Rita was represented on the two divorce actions by Debbie Hann,
Legal Aid, and James Medlin. James was represented by Glen M. Richman.
Both cases were dropped.
They were nearing the end when Rita was forced to find a job to
cover expenses.

James retired. He said, "I worked 40 years for this and I

am not going to work anymore. You're going to have to work. I'm not
going to give you anymore money because I earned it and you haven't
worked any.
was work.

Apparently James didn't think that what Rita did at home
James took Rita off their joint bank account.

She had a hard time finding work with no job experience.

She hadn't

worked outside the home for many years.
A friend obtained a job for her at the Hilton Hotel as a server; in the
banquet service at $5.75 an hour.

It was very heavy work, four to five

hour shifts until 12 or 1 a.m., about three days a week.

It bothered Rita's

heart condition and at 53 years of age she didn't have the energy and
fortitude she once had; she earned about Five Hundred dollars ($500.00) a
month.

Since James had taken her off the family checking account and

gave her no money, she used her earnings to buy her necessities and
clothes for the children. He called the money in the bank "his money" as
he had "went out and earned it." She bought most of her clothes at D.I.'s.
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On March 3, 1990 James moved from their home at 655 H Street, (A30), Salt Lake City into their other home at 5685 South 3650 West, in
Bennion; as he had during his 1987 complaint, (A-31).
time.

It was vacant at the

They had rented it to their son, Jim, who lived there approximately

three months out of the year.
The last straw was when he locked Amy, then 14 years old, out of
the house in freezing weather; telling Joy if she let her in that he would
ground her for three months.
He started his manipulations again to be in control.

Rita felt that he

slept with "one eye open" to catch her doing something wrong.
She tried to keep their marriage together because she knew that he
had a bad heart. He was on a lot of medication.

She tried to understand

and live the oath they took when they were married, "through sickness
and in health till death do we part."
She gave her all, but couldn't sacrifice her girls and everything she
believed in.

Rita felt that he was such a perfectionist that no one could do

enough to please him.
The day he left Rita was sick in bed . She had just brought Amy back
home.

James asked Amy, "Are you home to visit or stay." Rita wouldn't

fight with him that day. Amy and Joy can vouch for that. He wanted to
have complete control of Amy.
James didn't know what being married meant. He made Rita pay
everyday of their marriage because HE put a roof over her and the
children's heads.

She lived under these conditions for the children's sake

and she also still loved him. He took advantage of her love, playing with
her emotions.

He tried to do everything to rule her, not love her. All she
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wanted was his LOVE, but he wasn't capable of love. He thought control of
Rita and the children was loving them. Shouting, that she was a "Mooch."
By now he had completely deserted and abandoned his wife and
children; leaving them destitute and depending on Rita's

part-time income

from the Hilton Hotel for support.
This was the last straw.

Rita didn't know how she would

support

herself and the children, but she had had enough of James' tricks. She filed
for divorce on March 8, 1990, (Verified Complaint),
James furious.

(A-l), which made

He thought this would be the last thing she would do.

On this third divorce complaint Rita was represented by H. Delbert
Welker, paying him Nine Hundred Seventy Dollars ($970.00) from the sale
of some items from their home.
James then used the court, trying to force Rita to move from their
home on H Street, (A-30). Without a signed Court Order for her to vacate
her home, she would not move.

She felt that the United States Constitution

guaranteed her "Right" to stay safely in their home and to protect and care
for herself and her children.

Rita never expected to received such an

"Order" from the Court, and too, she didn't have moving money.
James and Rita jointly owned two houses. Rita and their three
children, including Susan who is handicapped, lived in the Salt Lake City
home (A-30).

James lived alone in their Bennion home, (A-31), where he

had moved; deserting and abandoning his family.

He gave Rita no money

to help her support the children or to pay any of the bills until May 1st
when she received child support.
When the issue of Rita moving from their home was raised by the court,
there was no discussion of what Rita was to do with the children if she did
move; though she had temporary custody.
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The parties have not lived together since the third complaint was
filed.
Then Mr. Welker moved to California; withdrawing from the case .
He didn't return any money that Rita had paid him; even though he hadn't
completed her case as agreed.
Rita then retained Earl S. Spafford, from the same law firm to
represent her; paying him Two Hundred Dollars ($200.00).
Rita's moving from their home was discused in the court.
ordered to move within ten (10) days

Rita was

(Tr. p. 54, line 24 & A-57).

When Rita was unable to leave their home, as she had no money to make
the move, Mr. Spafford withdraw from her case.
In a letter to Rita, dated July 19, 1990, he stated:
"I cannot endorse your decision to defy the Court Order,
This alone is a basis for Withdrawal."
A letter from Earl S. Spafford to Glen M. Richman, James1 Attorney,
dated July 18, 1990, stated:
I have informed her of my intention to withdraw not yet
mailed to her not yet (check letter) filed with the court. I will
withhold acting on this matter for a few days, pending a reply
from you. I am authorized to inform you that Rita will, upon
payment of $3,000.00 vacate the home, execute an appropriate
deed of conveyance to your client and stipulate the entry of a
decree. Such offer would necessarily contemplate that she
would have custody of the children and that there would be an
appropriate order of support and a fair allocation of the
personal property of the parties.
Rita never received this Three Thousand Dollars ($3,000) or an
appropriate order of support and a fair allocation of the personal property
of the parties.
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Rita had no money with which to pay another lawyer.

So she

decided to act, pro se, in her own defense.
The Case had degenerated into a case of selling the Salt Lake City
home on 655 H Street, (A-32), fast; a "Fire Sale" at any price, at that. Just
get the house sold. But nothing was said of selling the other home at 5685
South 3650 West, Bennion; (A-31), where James was living on his U.P
Corporation Pension Plan payment of Three Thousand Ninety Five Dollars
and 72 Cents ($3,095.72) a month; as he was now retired.
Rita sold the home alright, for One Hundred and Eighteen Thousand
Dollars ($118,000).

She had two appraisals of over Two Hundred Thousand

Dollars ($200,000) each.

But, with pressure from the Court she could not

wait longer for the right buyer.

The net proceeds were to be reported in

full to Judge John Rokich by James for a determination by the Court as to a
division.

James reported part of the proceeds to Judge John Rokich who

made a determination that Rita should receive $3,000 with stipulations.
(A-64)

[Emphasis added]

James
(A-46),.

received a final check from the Lincoln Service Corporation,

He requested Rita to indorse it and would not allow her see the

face of the check. "It's a Two Thousand Dollar check." he said.
to endorse it.

She refused

Rita received a photo-copy of the check from the Lincoln

Service Corporation

(A-46). The amount was Two Thousand Three

Hundred Forty Five Dollars and Seventy Five Cents

($2.345,75).

She was

informed that it would not be accepted by the Lincoln Service Corporation
without her endorsement.

She was also told that the check would be

invalid after ninety (90) days.

She does not know what happened to the

check. The law says that she should get half of it. (Nesmith v. Nesmith).
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James is retired, receives a monthly U.P Corporation Pension Plan
payment of Three Thousand Three Hundred Forty Five Dollars and Seventy
Five Cents ($3,095.72), it may increase at age 60. He has had open heart
surgery in 1987; is a serious diabetic and must receive insulin.
Rita was employed by Hilton Hotel.

She received Gross Earnings of

Five Thousand Three Hundred Seventy Three Dollars and Nineteen Cents
$5,373.19 for the year 11/28/89 to 12/02/90.

She is no longer employed

by the Hilton because the work proved to be to heavy for her serious heart
condition.

She got severe pains in her chest.

She is also a serious diabetic,

and like James must also receive insulin.
The record includes the letter below from Thomas B. Keith, M.D. and
a letter from Robert M. Maddock, Jr. M.D., F.A.C.P., dated 3/25/87.
Mrs. Rita Gum has reported to me several injuries which
she states were caused by her husband. On 3/25/87 she came
to the office with a bruised L. foot. X-ray at Holy Cross Hospital
revealed a fracture of proximal phalanyx of the 5th left toe.
This occurred on 2/24/87 in scuffle with husband. According
to Mrs. Gum, he has had severe problems controling his anger
since heart surgery. He also may be having insulin reactions in
the early morning hours as his anger seems greater when he
first gets up. He has been offered help voluntarily, but refuses.
Mrs. Gum fears for the safety of herself and children. The
police have been called on 3 occasions in the past two months
by one of the children, herself and a neighbor to report violent
behavior on his part according to Mrs. Gum (A-33).
A letter from Dr. Thomas B. Keith, M.D., dated November 2, 1989,
reported:
— Mrs. Gum has chest pain, which is probable due to
mitral valve prolapse, which is present by physical
examination and on echocardiogram. In addition to her mitral
valve prolapse, the patient has diabetes melitus, which is
treated by Dr. Robert Maddock (A-34).
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Rita had placed her physical and mental condition in issue during her
deposition on the 25th day of May, 1990.

A subpoena was issued for a

records deposition from her two doctors.

Rita through her, then counsel,

obtained an ex parte protective order quashing the deposition notices, but
they were obtained at a later date.
Rita was working two jobs, Hilton Hotel and Smith's, although she
was suffering heart pains from her work.

She is now unemployed.

She receives child support payments from James of Five Hundred
Fifty Four Dollars ($554.00) per month and no alimony.
James took Rita off his health insurance. She has to buy insulin,
needles and paraphernalia.

He refused to pay Amy's $91.00 emergency

dental service, because he "didn't have previous knowledge."
have money to complete needed work

Rita doesn't

(A-44).

He told Rita he's "paying only what the court ordered" and "My
lawyer told me that the divorce is final." Apparently his lawyer, Glen M.
Richman, isn't familiar with Section 30-3-7,

Utah Code Annotated. 1953, as

amended, (A-60), and Section 30-3-8, Utah Code Annotated- 1953, as
amended, (A-60).

James said, "I trust my lawyer."

He telephoned Rita, January 29th about completing the IRS child
support exemption form. He had one and wanted to bring it over for her
sign.

She said, "go through your attorney or mail it too me." He became

abusive and shouted, "You pathetic bitch. I hate your guts." And, slammed
down the phone. Joy was on the other phone. Rita wants James' abuse
stopped as provided by Section 30-6-2, Utah Code Annotated. 1953, as
amended.

She doesn't have to take it anymore.
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She received the IRS form in the mail; completed it, mailed a copy to
Glen M. Richman, James Attorney, and filed a copy with the Court of
Appeals disclaiming any responsibility if it is used before it is legal.
STANDARD OF REVIEW APPLICABLE TO THIS APPEAL
Trial courts have considerable discretion in adjusting the financial
and property interest of parties in a divorce, and the decision of the trial
court is presumed valid. Ruhsam v. Ruhsam. 742 P.2d 123 (Utah App.
1987).

This presumption is overcome where the appellant shows that the

trial court misunderstood or misapplied the law resulting in substantial
and prejudicial error; or that the evidence clearly preponderated against
the findings; or that such a serious inequity occurred so as to manifest a
clear abuse of discretion.

l±.

In determining whether an error has been

made by the trial court, the appellate court may review both the facts and
the law, Wiese v. Wiese. 699 P.2d 700 (Utah 1985).
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Trial was held on September 6, 1990, before the District Court, sitting
without jury.
Finding of Fact, Conclusions of Law (A-ll) and a Decree of Divorce
(22) were entered on September 10, 1990.
Appellant filed an Affidavit of Impecuniosity, (A-65), and a Notice of
Appeal, (A-27), on October 4, 1990.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks the following relief on appeal:
1.

For an Order reversing and vacating the trial court's award of a

mutual Decree of Divorce, (A-22), and modifying the Decree granted below,
ruling that the Appellant is awarded the Decree of Divorce upon the
grounds of cruelty
21

2.

Modifying the amount of child support awarded under the

provisions of the Uniform Child Support Schedules for the two children in
light of the true incomes of both parties and for an Order providing that
Respondent pay the former husbands forgiven past child support to and
including the children who have reached maturity.
3.

For an Order providing that permanent alimony be paid to

appellant to thereby maintain her standard of living as in the marriage
during the time Respondent was receiving his pension and addressing the
matter of the Appellant's ability to support herself,
4.

For an Order providing an equitable division of all marital

property including the second home which was not sold and in giving the
Appellant a proper lien thereon and providing for the division of other
marital property with the Appellant beyond the given sum of Three
Thousand Dollars from the proceeds of the sale of one home as her
settlement of marital property, adjusted with of a given fair dollar amount
from her portion as settlement

to Respondent for property over which she

has lost control and can not return (the oriental sword, the hunting rifle
and the binoculars) (A-35).
5.

For an Order providing that Respondent shall pay the

Appellant's past trial court costs and fees as well as those of having to
make this appeal, and to consider under Utah law, (1) the reasonableness
of the fee; (2) the need of the Appellant to have her fee paid or
contributed to; and (3) the ability of the Respondent from whom the fee is
being requested to contribute to or pay an attorney's fee award.
6.

An Order for a fair share of interest to the Appellant in and

pertaining to Respondent's benefit plans, retirement plans, savings, stock
plans or any other benefit plan whatsoever as allowed in law.
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7.

A ruling that the trial court erred in placing undue emphasis

on the quick sale of one of the parties' homes and not the other and that
there was an error in law in ordering plaintiff to move quickly from her
home and forcing its sale at an unreasonable low price and in failing to
consider all other factors in the court's
8.

determination.

A finding that the conduct of the District Court constituted

judicial bias.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

Marital History
The parties were married on March 24, 1982 , in Salt Lake County,
State of Utah (p. 2, par. 2 - Record on Appeal).
Rita was 46 years of age and James was 52 when they were married.
During the marriage relationship, the parties have acquired
investments which should be equitably divided (p. 3, par. 8 - Record on
Appeal).
Rita is the mother of two minor children who were adopted by
defendant and are considered to be issue of the marital relationship, to wit:
Amy Charmaine Gum (DOB 3/14/75) and Joy Charmaine Gum
9/22/76)

(DOB

(p.2, par. 3 - Record on Appeal).

On March 8, 1990, Rita filed a Complaint for divorce (pp. 2-4,Record on Appeal).
Defendant moved out of the parties' place of residence

(p. 7, par. 2 -

Record on Appeal).
Defendant

failed to provide for any expenses for plaintiff such that

the house payment and all utilities will remain unpaid, if they are not paid
by defendant

(p. 7, par. 3.- Record on Appeal).
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Defendant took plaintiffs name off all bank accounts and has
withheld all marital assets and money from plaintiff except her part-time
employment at the Hilton Hotel from which she earns $300 to $400 per
month (p. 7, par. 4 - Record on Appeal).
Plaintiff needed the home and furnishings to care for the children
and $540.00 per month as temporary child support

(p. 7, par. 5 - Record

on Appeal).
Rita is a fit and proper parent who should be awarded the care,
custody and control of the minor children subject to defendant's
reasonable visitation (p. 3, par. 5

- Record on Appeal).

Defendant should maintain all health, accident and life insurance
policies preserving the currently named beneficiaries until the youngest
child reaches age 18. (p. 3, par. 13 - Record on Appeal).
Rita is entitled to retirement income from defendant's employment
when she is age 60, said retirement should be ordered by the Court

(p. 3,

par. 9 - Record on Appeal).
On March 26, 1990, James filed an Answer and Counterclaim

(pp. 12

- 27 - Record on Appeal).
ERA - Carlson & Company, Realtors, letter dated April 5, 1990:
Rita Gum has been most cooperative in trying to get her
home sold. She has provided a key for the front door, which is
in a Realtors' key box. This makes the house accessible to all
Realtors at any time.
Rita has kept the property in a show-able condition and
agreed to a price reduction in order to try to get the home sold
(p. 188 - Record on Appeal).
In May 1990 Rita received a copy of Order on Order to Show Cause
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and Objections to Commissioner's Recommendation.

ORDERS as follows:

The plaintiff shall vacate the parties home on or before
the 20th day of May, 1990 and the defendant shall take
possession thereof (p. 62, par. 2 - Record on Appeal).
This order should clearly be a violation of Rita's and the minor
children's rights under the 14th Amendment of Section 1 of the United
States Constitution as quoted (p. 44, par. 3 - Record on Appeal).
The home was jointly owned by Rita and James (A-30)

as well as

the one at 5685 South 3650 West, Bennion, Utah, (A-31), which they
bought and rented to Jim Gum, James son.
Commissioner Peuler was also influenced by the fact that defendant
was living in his son's home (the son was not there). He was not making
any rental or mortgage payments on the home and was thus enjoying free
housing (p. 51, par. 8 - Record on Appeal).
The rental agreement was and still is making the mortgage payments
and James is still living there.
Commissioner Peuler stated that it would be in the best interests of
the children for plaintiff and the children to stay in the home until the
home is sold (p. 50, par. 5 - Record on Appeal).
The Court's ruling that plaintiff move out of the home in Twenty
days is not reasonable due to the fact that the children are in school until
June 8 and such a move would disrupt the children's school and social
activities

(p. 51, par. 9 - Record on Appeal).

On the 25th day of May, 1990 Rita was deposed and during said
deposition she put her physical and medical condition into issue.

She made

a claim for alimony in her Complaint (p. 98, par. 2 - Record on Appeal).
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Mr. Welker was sent a copy of the deposition notices and a letter
dated May 30, 1990 which in part says:
It appears it will be necessary to take the depositions of
Dr. Keith and Dr. Maddock. (p. 100, par. 4 - Record on Appeal).
Rita received a Notice of Withdrawal of Counsel dated 31 day of May,
1990 — on the grounds that he is permanently moving to California

(p.

M. Record on Appeal).
Earl S. Spafford and L. Charles Spafford of the firm of Spafford and
Spafford enter their appearance as her counsel June 12, 1990

(p. 81,-

Record on Appeal).
There after it appears that Mr. Spafford entered an appearance
signed the 12th day of June, presented an Ex Parte Motion to a judge not
assigned to the case for a protective order, and received an Ex Parte
Protective Order and Stay without any notification to plaintiffs counsel,
(p. 100, par. 6 - Record on Appeal).
Dr. Robert K. Maddock Jr., M.D. was served Subpoena Duces Tecum on
13 June 90 (p. 120 - Record on Appeal).
Dr. Thomas B. Keith, M.D. was not available for service (p. 117,Record on Appeal).
Rita through her attorney Earl S. Spafford requests of the court oral
argument on her Motion for Stay of Proceedings and for Rehearing, June
18, 1990 (p.-45r- Record on Appeal).
Rita- through her attorney^Earhff.r Spafford-requests -o£ the^eourt oral
argument -on-her-Motion^ for Stay of Proceedings and ^or Rehearing, June
18, 1990—(pr~95, * Reeord^on^AppealV
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Despite the Order requiring the plaintiff to move from the home by
the 20th day of May, she has refused to do so and is in disobedience of the
Court Order, and remains in said home (p. 99, par. 3 - Record on Appeal).
Defendant moves the Court for an Order to Show Cause requiring the
plaintiff to show cause, if any she has, why she should not be required to
immediately vacate the parties' home as required by earlier Court Order,
and upon her failure to do so, why she should not be held in contempt and
punished accordingly

(p. 102, par. 13 - Record on Appeal).

Defendant desires to have the medical records for the claimed
treatment of plaintiff which she has put in issue, unless plaintiff forever
waives any claim to alimony (p. 102, par. 11 - Record on Appeal).
Defendant, James R. Gum, purchased a home in 1970 with his first
wife who is now deceased.

The majority of dispute in this action appears

to revolve around the house which was clearly premarital property of the
defendant

(p. 122, par. 1 - Record on Appeal).

But, this house became jointly owned by the two parties when they
took a new mortgage on it making Rita also responsible for the payments.
Defendant has agreed that any money additions accrued to his
retirement during the marriage of the parties should be divided equally
between the parties

(p. 123, par. 9 - Record on Appeal).

Plaintiff is impecunious.

She has no resources with which to pay the

costs of moving and no present ability to provide substitute housing for
the minor children of the parties. Plaintiff is 54 years of age and in fragile

health. CpL /#$j POA&~ y&^^J^

&rv ^^(Z^^C

J

Plaintiff made diligent inquiry in an effort to find adequate housing
for herself and daughters without success.
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In this regard she has inquired

as to public shelters and was informed that housing is available only for a
short term basis. £ p, y ^ p^t

^

y^^U

0*.

^ a t a l j

To move said minor children into a shelter environment would
impact upon their schooling, their church activity, their social relationship
and their welfare, and would not be in their best interest

(p. 148, par. 6 -

8 - Record on Appeal) (Emphasis added).
Plaintiff, Rita C. Gum, is to vacate the home of the parties where she
has been residing, located at 655 H Street, (A-30), Salt Lake City, Utah,
within ten (10) days from the 11th day of July, 1990; that on or before the
21st day of July, 1990.
Immediately after the date the plaintiff vacates the home, the
defendant may occupy the home for a period of thirty (30) days for the
purpose of getting the home ready for sale.

The defendant must vacate

the home within thirty (30) days from his occupancy and the home must
be sold within thirty (30) days thereafter. £ # J&£ pfasJl~/Q££*kdL

fa

d/^fudJ

The depositions of Dr. Keith and Dr. Maddock may be taken, and the
records obtained. £ ^ / £ ^

^

The difference in the refund from the two returns, that is the savings
or additional refund received by filing joint return, is to be paid over to
the plaintiff

(p. 168, par. 0 - 4 - Record on Appeal).

The court, having received Motion for an Order to withdraw, good
cause appearing therefore, it is hereby ORDERED:
Earl S, Spafford of the firm of SPAFFORD & SPAFFORD, a
Professional Corporation, attorneys for the Plaintiff, Rita Gum,
are to withdraw as attorney of record in the above entitled
matter. Dated this 30 day of July, 1990
(p. 165 - Record on
Appeal).
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Rita sold the house herself at a "give away price" of One Hundred and
Eighteen Thousand Dollars ($118,000).

She had two appraisals of over Two

Hundred Thousand Dollars ($200,000).
Rita filed a Supplement to Complaint and Partial Response to
Defendant's Counter Offer, (A-48), of July 25, 1990:
My attorneys have withdrawn, and I am so depleted
financially that I am unable to incur further attorney's
expenses, and therefore choose to represent myself and file
this for myself (p. 173 - Record on Appeal & A-47).
She was also exhausted and depleted emotionally.
do almost anything to get the divorce over with.

She was willing to

She was willing to let

James be awarded the divorce. Let him have custody of the children
they choose. She had sold the family home herself
the court decide how to divide the money.

if

or gave it away; let

She was agreeable in letting the

court determine the amount of child support.

She only requested "that the

court, after full examination and consideration, resolve them as his sense
of equity and justice dictate."
What did the court's sense of equity and justice dictate?
Rita was handed the Trial Brief, (A-5), in court by Glen M. Richman,
the Defendant's Attorney, with n<? chance t9 read it beforehandIt is headed:
Glen M. Richman, (2757)
RICHMAN & RICHMAN
Attorneys for Plaintiff
RITA B. GUM
Plaintiff,
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Can Mr. Richman represent both parties legally in Utah?

Isn't this a

conflict of interest? Maybe not. But isn't it like having the fox guard the
hen-house

(p. 178 - Record on Appeal)?

The Decree for Divorce was headed the same way, the first paragraph
read:
1.
Defendant is hereby awarded a Decree of Divorce
upon the grounds of irreconcilable differences, to be final upon
entry (p. 201, par. 1. - Record on Appeal & A-22).
This clause could be expected from the Attorney for the Defendant.
The Trial Brief, (A-l), which is headed, Attorneys for Plaintiff, is
signed by GLENN M. RICHMAN, Attorney for Defendant (p. 182 - Record on
Appeal) [Emphasis added]
Judge John A. Rokich changed this paragraph (handwritten) to read:
1.
Plaintiff and Defendant are hereby awarded a
mutual Decree of Divorce upon the grounds of irreconcilable
differences, to be final upon entry (p. 201, par. 1. - Record on
Appeal & & A-22).

Trial Proceedings
The record in this case is voluminous due in large part to the fact
that the plaintiff did not have funds to move from her home on H Street,
(A-30).

Substantial portions of the record deal with this issue and no

provisions of funds were made to help her move.
At the conclusion of what appears to be a very unorthodox and
disjointed trial proceeding, the trial court allowed the defendant's attorney.
Glen M. Richman, to prepare the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,
(A-11), as Attorneys for Plaintiff which alone should make the divorce
invalid (p.

189 - Record on Appeal & A-ll).
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This Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, (A-ll), was handed to
the plaintiff in court, September 6, 1990, the day of the trial with no
opportunity before-hand to read it.
On October 4, 1990, Rita filed a Notice of Appeal (p. 207 - Record on
Appeal).

No Cross-Appeal has been filed.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

POINT I:
THERE IS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD TO SUPPORT
FINDINGS OF FACT #1, BUT RATHER THE DIVORCE SHOULD BE AWARDED TO
THE PLAINTIFF ON NEW GROUNDS OF CRUELTY, (p. 201, par. 1 - Record on
Appeal)
The Appellant in bringing her action for divorce felt that a Decree of
Divorce could be awarded to her from Respondent upon many grounds;
covered in the factual background above.
Plaintiff elected to file on grounds of irreconcilable differences and
felt that she would be dealt with fairly.

This was not the case.

Plaintiff now seeks an order of this Court modifying the Decree
granted below; asking that a Decree of Divorce, be granted her on the
grounds of cruelty.
POINT II:
THERE IS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD TO SUPPORT
FINDINGS OF FACT #9, BUT RATHER, DEFENDANT IS ABLE TO SUPPORT THE
MINOR CHILDREN MORE EST THE MANNER THAT THEY WERE ACCUSTOMED
DURING THE MARRIAGE AND THE COURT SHOULD SO ORDER, (p. 201, par. 3
- Record on Appeal)
See Decree of Adoption dated the 4th day of September 1984 (A-66).
POINT III:
THE DENIAL OF ALIMONY TO PLAINTIFF WAS AN ERROR IN LAW,
FACT #5, BUT RATHER DEFENDANT IS ABLE TO SUPPORT THE PLAINTIFF
MORE IN THE MANNER THAT SHE WAS ACCUSTOMED TO DURING THE
31

MARRIAGE AND THE COURT SHOULD SO ORDER, (p. 202, par. 5 - Record on
Appeal).
The trial court erred in not awarding permanent alimony to Rita.
Although Rita wanted to work outside the home and develop a career
James did not want her to, but rather wanted her to stay home and attend
to the children's and his needs as well as caring for their home.

He felt his

Seventy Five Thousand Dollars ($75,000) per year salary was adequate for
their needs.

In not making this award, the trial court erroneously failed to

maintain the wife's standard of living which had already been lowered by
James retirement.

In addition, the trial courts Finding relative to not

awarding alimony were fatally defective in that they did not address the
wife's ability to support herself or provide the necessary financial facts to
support the no alimony award. The Alimony award should be made in a
fair manner.
POINT IV:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT DIVIDING ALL THE MUTUAL
PROPERTY FACTS #11, #12, #13 and # 14 IN A MORE EQUITABLE MANNER,
INCLUDING THE SECOND HOME WHICH WAS NOT SOLD., BUT RATHER THIS
DIVISION SHOULD BE RECONSIDERED AND AN EQUITABLE AWARD MADE
TO THE PLAINTIFF, (p. 202, par. 6 - Record on Appeal)
The Appellant has an interest in Property which was acquired during
the marriage which is required by law to be divided equitably.
POINT V:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE OF
EVIDENCE PRESENTED AND SHOULD HAVE AWARDED PLAINTIFF HER COSTS
AND FEES FOR HAVING TO TAKE THIS ACTION, FACT #9. (p. 203, par. 9 Record on Appeal)
Under Utah law, the party requesting an award of attorney's fees has
the burden of proving three elements: (1)

the reasonableness of the fee;

(2) the need of the party to have his or her fee paid or contributed to; and
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(3) the ability of the party from whom the fee is being requested to
contribute to or pay an attorney's fee award.

In this case all three

elements may have been present in terms of evidence in the record.

The

trial court erroneously required Rita to pay her attorney's fees when Rita
had not the income nor the property to look to in order to pay such fee and
had to proceed with her case pro se.

As such, the trial court's attorney's

fee order should be reversed and vacated and replaced with an order
requiring James to pay her fees as well as those of this appeal.
POINT VI:
THE DENIAL OF THE PLAINTIFFS INTEREST IN AND ENTITLEMENT
PERTAINING TO DEFENDANTS BENEFIT PLANS, RETIREMENT PLANS,
THRIFT PLANS, SAVINGS, STOCK PLANS OR OTHER BENEFIT PLAN
WHATSOEVER WAS AN ERROR IN LAW, FACT #12, AND SHOULD BE
RECONSIDERED WITH AN EQUITABLE AWARD.MADE TO THE PLAINTIFF.
(p. 194, par. 14 - Record on Appeal)
POINT VII:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PLACING UNDUE EMPHASIS ON THE
QUICK SALE OF ONE OF THE PARTIES' HOMES AND NOT THE OTHER AND
THERE WAS AN ERROR IN LAW IN ORDERING PLAINTIFF TO MOVE
QUICKLY FROM HER HOME, FORCING ITS SALE AT AN UNREASONABLY LOW
PRICE, AND IT SHOULD BE SO NOTED IN THE RECORD.
The trial court failed to follow United States constitutional law.
POINT VIII:
THE CONDUCT OF THE TRIAL JUDGE CONSTITUTES JUDICIAL BIAS.
This judicial bias is evident in the trial transcript.
ARGUMENT
I:
THERE IS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD TO
SUPPORT FINDINGS OF FACT #1, BUT RATHER THE DIVORCE
SHOULD BE AWARDED TO THE PLAINTIFF ON NEW GROUNDS OF
CRUELTY.
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The Appellant in bringing her action for divorce felt that a Decree of
Divorce could be awarded to her from Respondent upon many grounds
The conduct of Respondent was over a period of many years with
such as acts, declarations, and conduct conjunctively constituting extreme
mental and physical cruelty, desertion, gross neglect of duty, extremely
argumentative, extremely authoritarian conduct, violent and ungovernable
temper, bodily acts, violent and threatening conduct, harsh, humiliating
demeanor, incompatibility with conflicts in personalities and disposition so
deep as to be irreconcilable and to render it impossible for the parties to
continue normal marital relationship; all the above could be considered as
cruelty.
In the case of Fischer v. Fischer 443 P.2d 463, 92 Idalio 379 (Idaho
1968)* the court stated:
Course of offensive conduct by one spouse toward other,
extending over period of years and resulting in grievous
mental suffering to innocent party, will constitute ground for
divorce, although isolated acts, separately and individually
considered, may be regarded as trivial." Saint v. Saint 411 P.2d
683. 196 Kan. 330 (Kan. 1966). Repeatedly angered at husband
and thereupon retiring to basement or bedroom to pout and
sulk for protracted periods and refusal to speak to or
communicate with husband for days at a time constituted
"extreme cruelty" within divorce statutes. Hansen v. Hansen
537 P.2d 491 (Utah 1975). Acts constituting cruel conduct
sufficient to cause great mental stress and suffering, as grounds
for divorce, need not be more aggravated or severe when
directed toward the husband than when directed toward the
wife. U.C.A. 1953, 30-3-2. Ultimate determination of whether
conduct complained of constitutes mental cruelty warranting
divorce depends on the effect of the conduct on the
complaining party, which must be evaluated in light of the
sensibilities of the individual party.
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Again in the case of Oliphant v. Oliphant 435 P.2d 29, 72 Wash.2d
666 (Wash. 1967).

the court stated:

Fact that divorced husband had treated wife cruelly and
subjected her to personal indignities making her life
burdensome and that he had been extremely argumentative
with her and extremely authoritarian to her and to children, all
of which caused her to become nervous and ill, justified divorce
for cruel treatment. RCWA 26.08-020(5).
In the historic case of Carter v. Carter 379 P2.d 311, 191 Kan. the
court stated:
Extreme cruelty as contemplated by divorce statute is not
limited to acts of physical violence, nor need it connote
viciousness, but only conduct which is unusual, disapproved
and not conducive to normal acts in accepted society. Any
unjustifiable and long-practiced course of conduct by one
spouse toward other which utterly destroys legitimate ends
and objects of matrimony constitutes extreme cruelty even
though no physical or personal violence may be inflicted or
threatened.

Plaintiff now seeks an order of this Court modifying the Decree
granted below.

The plaintiff should be granted a Decree of Divorce, on the

grounds of cruelty.
II:
THERE IS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD TO
SUPPORT FINDINGS OF FACT #3, BUT RATHER, DEFENDANT IS
ABLE TO SUPPORT THE MINOR CHILDREN MORE IN THE MANNER
THAT THEY WERE ACCUSTOMED DURING THE MARRIAGE AND THE
COURT SHOULD SO ORDER.
The Decree of Adoption dated the 4th day of September 1984, states:
. . .are adopted by James Richard Gum, with
all rights and duties he would have to his own
natural children, including to support,
35

maintain and educate them and treat them in
all respects as his own children: and they to
have all of the privileges and obligations of
children and parent to him — (A-66).
Section. 30-3-10.6,

Utah Code Annotated. 1953, as amended, codifies

what is required of a father in the State of Utah.
Child support doesn't necessarily end when a child is 18 years old as
we see in the case of Montague v. Montague 510 P.2d 901 (Colo.App. 1973)
The court stated:
Where alimony was granted to wife in sum of
$475 per month to enable her to maintain a home,
and trust for college education of children provided
not only strictly educational expenses, but also
living expenses of children for four years of college,
and supplemental order of court provided sufficient
additional payments for times when children were
not employed and living at home during summer
vacation months, failure to provide wife with
additional child support to maintain a home for
children even while they were away in college v/as
not an error. C.R.S/63, 46-1-5(4)
The protection of children is well documented in Utah law.

Despain

v. Despain 610 P.2d 1303 (Utah 1980). Divorce court sits as court in equity
so far as child custody, support payments and the like are concerned.
U.C.A. 1953, 30-3-5- Dehm v. Dehm 5545 P.2d 525 (Utah 1976) Divorce
courts are deemed to have broad equitable powers in safeguarding the
interests and welfare of children and the decree and orders in a divorce
proceeding are of a different and higher character than judgments in an
action of law. Barrett v. Barrett 403 P.2d 649, 17 Utah 2d 1. (Utah 1965).
Where grounds for divorce had been established and it plainly appeared
that marriage had disintegrated to point where it would be folly to do
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otherwise than to dissolve it, trial court had no other alternative than to
grant a divorce and to make such arrangement with respect to children
and property rights as might provide best possible foundation for future of
parties.
It is respectfully requested of this court to protect the rights of the
children of this union, as fully as the law allows, and to give full
consideration of who is responsible and how the children will be
compensated for the lost back child support owed by their natural father;
due to the agreement, with him, of the parties to this action.
Ill:
THE DENIAL OF ALIMONY TO PLAINTIFF WAS AN
ERROR IN LAW, FACT #5, BUT RATHER DEFENDANT IS ABLE TO
SUPPORT THE PLAINTIFF MORE IN THE MANNER THAT SHE WAS
ACCUSTOMED TO DURING THE MARRIAGE AND THE COURT SHOULD
SO ORDER.
In making an award of alimony, trial courts in Utah are duty bound
to consider the financial condition and needs of the spouse requesting
alimony, the ability of that spouse to produce sufficient income for herself
or himself and the ability of the paying spouse to provide support to the
requesting spouse.

(Olson v. Olson, 704 P.2d 564 (Utah 1985); Newmeyer

v. Newmever. 745 P.2d 276 (Utah 1987); Jones v. Jones. 700 P.2d 1072
(Utah 1985); Canning v. Canning. 744 P.2d 325 (Utah App. 1987); and
Schindler v. Schindler. 776 P.2d 84 (Utah App. 1989).
Once the court has considered the evidence related to these criteria,
it must then attempt to adjust the parties' finances to arrive at support
figures which achieve as closely as possible an equalization of the
standards of living of both parties and then as a secondary consideration,
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attempt to maintain each of them at a level as close as possible to the
standard of living they enjoyed while married.
As was stated by the Utah Supreme Court in Olson v. Olson. 704 P.2d
564 (Utah 1985):
An alimony award should, as far as possible, equalize the
parties1 respective standards of living and maintain them at a
level as close as possible to the standard of living enjoyed
during the marriage.
The record is completely void of evidence showing the court's
consideration of the factors articulated by the Utah Supreme Court and
Utah Court of Appeals relating to alimony awards.
The court has stated:
An alimony award should, to the extent possible, equalize
the parties' respective post divorce living standards and
maintain them at a level as close as possible to that standard of
living enjoyed during the marriage." Gardner v. Gardner 748
P.2d 1076 (Utah 1988)x The Utah Supreme Court has
articulated three factors that must be considered by the trial
court in determining a reasonable alimony award: (1) The
financial conditions and needs of the requesting spouse; (2)
the ability of the requesting spouse to produce a sufficient
income for himself of herself; and (3) the ability of the other
spouse to provide support
Failure to consider these factors constitutes an abuse of the
trial court discretion. Paffel v. Paffel 732 P.2d 96, 100 (Utah 1986).
In the case of Rasband v. Rasband 752 P.2d 1331 (Utah App. 1988),
the court stated:
The trial court made one vague, conclusive finding
regarding Mrs. Rasband's present and future ability to produce
a sufficient income to meet her needs . . .
the Findings of Fact
must show that the court's judgment or decree 'follows logically
from and is supported by the evidence'." Smith v. Smith 726
P.2d 423. 426 (Utahl986). The findings "should be sufficiently
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detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the
steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue
was reached".
In the case of Fletcher v. Fletcher. 615 P.2d 1218 (Utah 1980) the
court stated:
Function of alimony is to provide support for wife as
nearly as possible at the standard of living she enjoyed during
marriage and prevent wife from becoming public charge;
criteria in determining reasonable award of support include
financial conditions and needs of wife, ability of wife to
produce sufficient income for herself, and ability of husband to
to provide support. English v. English. 565 P.2d 409 (Utah
1977).
The most important function of alimony is to provide
support for the wife as nearly as possible at the standard of
living she enjoyed during the marriage and to prevent the wife
from becoming a public charge.
The trial court volunteered no information regarding Rita's present
and future ability to produce a sufficient income to meet her and the
children's needs above a poverty level even with the child support
awarded.

Section 30-4-1,

Utah Code Annotated. 1953, as amended

codifies how this this need should be judged

(A-61).

The record shows that the parties have been married over eight (8)
years, that Rita has no educational degree and that she had not worked
outside her home since 1966. (p.

par. 9 - Record on Appeal)

Rita obtained a poverty level job in October 1989 at the Hilton Hotel
as a hostess, (p.

par. 11 - Record on Appeal). She used this income to

support herself, and the children after James deserted and abandoned her
and the children leaving the family destitute.

She is no longer employed

by the Hilton Hotel.
By contrast, the record shows that James, on the other hand, was
living on his U.P Corporation Pension Plan payment of Three Thousand
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Ninety Five Dollars and 72 Cents ($3,095.72) a month; as he was now
retired and — was living in his son's home (the son was not there but
was paying rent).

The rent was making the

mortgage payments on the

home and James was thus enjoying free housing,
Appeal).

(p. 51. par. 8 - Record on

The rental agreement was and still is making the mortgage

payments and James is still living there.
The record shows no consideration of Rita's standard of living as set
forth in the foregoing Utah cases.
In the recent case of Naranjo v. Naranjo 751 P.2d 1144 (Utah App.
1988) the court stated:
Failure to analyze the parties' circumstances in the light
of these three factors constitutes an abuse of discretion . . ."
The Utah Supreme Court has noted that, "it is unrealistic to
assume that a woman in her mid-fifties with no substantial
work experience or training will be able to enter the job
market and support herself in anything even resembling the
style in which the couple had been living." Jones v. Jones 700
P.2d 1075 (Utah 1985) . . . where marriage is of long
duration and earning capacity of one spouse greatly exceeds
that of the other . . . it is appropriate to order alimony . . . at
a level which will insure that the supported spouse . . . may
maintain a standard of living not unduly disproportioned to
that which [she] would have enjoyed had the marriage
continued." Savage v. Savage 658 P.2d 1205 (Utah 1983).
Therefore the only way to achieve an equitable allocation of income
between the parties is to award alimony so that each party can at least
have similar standards of living. Even in so doing, there will still be a
disparity in disposable income, but under the circumstances of this case,
perhaps such a disparity is unavoidable.
As was stated in Gramme v. Gramme. 587 P.2d 144 (Utah 1978):
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The purpose of alimony is to provide post marital
support; it is intended neither as a penalty to be imposed on
the husband nor as a reward granted to the wife.
Finding of Fact #5 is not supported by evidence in the record and
should be reversed as an error in law.
IV:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT DIVIDING ALL THE
MUTUAL PROPERTY IN A MORE EQUITABLE MANNER, INCLUDING
THE SECOND HOME WHICH WAS NOT SOLD., FACT #6, BUT RATHER
THIS DIVISION SHOULD BE RECONSIDERED AND AN EQUITABLE
AWARD.MADE TO THE PLAINTIFF.
James testified as follows:
Q.

(By Mr. Richman)

Mr. Gum, when you were married to

your first wife did you purchase a home?
A.

Yes, I did.

Q.

Where is that home?

A.

635 H Street here in Salt Lake City.

Q.

And whose money did you use to purchase that home?

A.

My money.

Q.

And is that where the plaintiff is residing at the time?

A.

Yes.

Q.
Was the house remodeled after you married this present wife,
Rita Gum?
A.

Yes, it was.

Q.

And whose money was used to remodel the house?

A.

My money.

Q.

Was it from your earnings at work?

A.

Earnings, my earnings.

Q.

And savings?

A.

And savings.
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Q.
And was there any money at the time provided to you by Rita
Gum, the plaintiff in this action, to remodel or purchase anything toward
the upkeep of this house?
A.

None whatsoever. (Tr. p. 3, line 24 to p. 4, line 24 & A-50 & A-

51).
There were three mortgages, taken in the names of the parties for
funds to do the remodeling, causing the property to be held jointly.
Proffer by Mr, Spafford as follows:
Mr. Spafford:

Let me make a proffer, your honor, to save a

lot of time.
My proffer is that she earns less than $600 a month; he earns
$3,000 month. This couple has two homes. The one is the exhibit 9-P,
which is the home they're living in. It is owned jointly by them, and while
admittedly it was acquired prior to the marriage, during the marriage from
marital assets the home was remodeled. Indeed it was conveyed to her
jointly with him, so she's has an equitable interest in the property, (A-30).
They have a second piece of property in Salt Lake County, the
lot 72, Whitewood Estates, another home which is also deeded to the two
parties jointly, Mr. Gum has placed, under a rental agreement, his son in
the second piece property, and he is collecting the rent on it, (A-31).
So effectively, your order dispossesses her of the home she's
living in and effectively grants him the possession of both pieces of
property, two homes [Emphasis added]
So we have the ludicrous situation of a woman who earns a
poverty level wage, who has no place to go. and who has a equity in two
separate pieces of property: and the husband winds up with both pieces of

property while she's effectively pwt out on the street (Tr. p. 20 & A-52).
[Emphasis added]
In re Marriage of Kittleson 585 P.2d 167, 21 Wash.App. 344
(Wash.App. 1978).

the court stated:

In marriage dissolution action, it is trial court's duty to
characterize property of parties as community or separate, and
to dispose of all property of parties which is brought to its
attention.
In another Washington case Lynn v. Lynn 480 P.2d 789, 4 Wash.App.
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171 (Wash.App. 1971) the court stated:
Although trial court is not in a divorce proceeding
required to award all separate property to the party acquiring
it or to divide community property equally, the court does not
have unfetted freedom to exercise its personal judgment.
RCWA 26.08-110.
Disposition of property is cited in Section 30-3-5, Utah Code
Annotated. 1953, as amended

(A-59).

In a Wyoming case Kane v. Kane 577 P.2d 172 (Wyo. 1978) the court
stated:
In a divorce proceeding the disposition of property of the
parties is an equitable function of the court.
Both homes of the parties were held in joint tenancy.

In the Arizona

case of Nesmith v. Nesmith 540 P.2d 1229, 112 Ariz. 248 (Ariz. 195).

it is

stated:
Joint tenancy property is to be divided equally by trial
court in divorce. A.R.S. § 25-318.
In making a division of marital property in a divorce proceeding, the
trial Court is governed by general principles of equity.

Title 30 Chapter 3,

Section 5, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, Land v. Land. 605 P.2d
1248.
This writer submits that there is no semblance of equity in awarding
of the other home to the Respondent with no part of that asset to the
Appellant.
V:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO TAKE
JUDICIAL NOTICE OF EVIDENCE PRESENTED AND SHOULD HAVE
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AWARDED PLAINTIFF HER COSTS AND FEES FOR HAVING TO TAKE
THIS ACTION. FACT #9.
Section 30-3-3 Utah Code Annotated.

(1984) provides that a trial

court may award attorney fees and costs in a divorce action.

Rita C. Gum

was financially unable to pay the fees and costs. Huck v. Huck. 734 P.2d
417, 419 (Utah 1986).
This Court in the recent case of Rasband v. Rasband. 752 P.2d 1331
(Utah App. 1988) found that under the Utah Code Annotated Section 30-33 that on remand the Trial Court should also determine the Appellant's
need for Respondent's payment of her attorney's fees incurred in the
appeal and that if a financial need were adequately shown that the Trial
Court could take evidence regarding a reasonable fee in making such an
order pursuant to that statute.
Under Utah code Annotated Section 30-3-3 and Heltman v. Heltman.
511 P.2d 720 (Utah 1973) this Court should consider this appeal and so
order.
In the case of Fite v. Fite 479 P. 2d 560, 3 Wash.App. 726 (Wash.App.
1970) x

the court stated:

Where wife had, when divorce action was commenced, no
assets on which to draw for payment of attorney's fees and
costs, fact that she would receive assets when litigation was
finally terminated was not test of whether attorney's fees
should be allowed, and award to wife of $10,000 for attorney's
fees for services rendered in unraveling and establishing
community interest in over 10 years of transactions, both
inside and outside husband's business pursuit, and $1,800 for
costs with which to pay wife's accountant was not an abuse of
discretion.
Defendant should be ordered to pay plaintiffs attorneys' fees for
being forced to file this action, (p. 4 par. 15 - Record on Appeal).
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Rita C. Gum respectfully submits that where she has a continuing
need and James Richard Gum's income far exceeds her own, she should also
be awarded a reasonable attorney fee and costs incurred in the Trial Court
as well as in the bringing of this appeal.
VI:
THE DENIAL OF THE PLAINTIFF'S INTEREST IN AND
ENTITLEMENT PERTAINING TO DEFENDANT'S BENEFIT PLANS,
RETIREMENT PLANS, THRIFT PLANS, SAVINGS, STOCK PLANS OR
OTHER BENEFIT PLAN WHATSOEVER WAS AN ERROR IN LAW,
FACT #12, AND SHOULD BE RECONSIDERED WITH AN EQUITABLE
AWARD MADE TO THE PLAINTIFF.
A pension being considered as marital property (Woodward v.
Woodward. 656 P.2d 431 (Utah 1982), a portion of Respondent's monthly
pension benefits should be considered as an entitlement of Appellant.
The Utah Supreme Court in the oft cited case of Woodward v.
Woodward. 656 P.2d 431 (Utah 1982), specifically held, citing an earlier
case of Englert v. Englert. 576 P.2d 1247 (Utah 1978) as follows:
. . . We emphasize the equitable nature of proceedings dealing
with the family, pointing out that the court may take into
consideration all of the pertinent circumstances. These
circumstances encompass "all of the assets of every nature
possessed by the parties, whenever obtained and from
whatever source derived; and that this includes any such
pension fund or insurance". Id, at 1276. To the extent that
Bennett v. Bennett, supra, may limit the ability of the court to
consider all of the parties' assets and circumstances, including
retirement and pension rights, it is expressly overruled.
t

In the immediate case at hand, the Appellant based on the transcript

as -resistea by the ^ ^ n d e n t , did specifically ask for a division of the
retirement he was currently receiving as a part of property distribution.

A

review of the Memorandum Decision and the Findings of Fact, (A-ll). fails
to disclose any consideration by the Trial Court of the retirement benefits
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or a consideration of a division of that property as a marital asset accrued
during the parties marriage of 8 years.

The Court did find the income of

the Defendant/Respondent including his retirement to be $259,132 and did
not address the retirement as income to the Plaintiff, and failed to make
any distribution of that retirement as a marital asset or marital property
in the distribution thereof.

The retirement accumulated should be treated

as a marital asset and as personal property to be considered by the Court
in the division of the property.
Based upon the above and foregoing points of law, the fact that the
retirement is a marital asset and should be distributed equitably and the
Trial Court's failure to delineate through its findings of fact as required by
Rule 52 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure the Court's treatment of that
marital asset, the findings should be better delineated by this court.
VII:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PLACING UNDUE EMPHASIS
ON THE QUICK SALE OF ONE OF THE COUPLEfS HOMES AND NOT
THE OTHER AND THERE WAS AN ERROR IN LAW IN ORDERING
PLAINTIFF TO MOVE FROM HER HOME, FORCING ITS QUICK SALE
AT AN UNREASONABLY LOW PRICE, AND IT SHOULD BE SO NOTED
IN THE RECORD.
The trial court became angry when Rita was unable to move from
her home as quickly as he desired:
The Court: If you follow the rules of proper practice- and as I
say again, I'm not trying the attorneys here today, but Fm going to order
that she vacate it within ten days, and if she doesn't vacate within 10 days,
then the court will cite her for contempt. [Emphasis added]
And that doesn't mean Mr. Gum is going to take it over and live
in it. That house has got to be sold immediately. If it hasn't sold, the price
is too high. Something is the matter. So He's not going to take it and be in
the same position that she is, to live in the house and not get it sold. The
house is going to be sold. (Tr p. 42, lines 4-17 & A-55). [Emphasis added].
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But she has ten days to get moved, and you have ten days to
get the house in shape so it can be sold. (Tr. p. 42, lines 22 - 24 & A-55).
And if you need more than ten days to get it in condition, fine.
But there is no need to be moving into it because you're going to be out of
it shortly thereafter. (Tr. p. 44, lines 5-8 & A-56).
He can take possession and get it ready to be sold. I'm not
going to allow him to move into the premises, so, this house will be sold.
He may have to rent a place, but he's not going to be moving in.
She's going to be moving out. We'll get it sold and I think that
will resolve this case in a hurry. (Tr.. p. 45, lines 10 - 16)
Mr. Spafford: So effectively, your order dispossesses her of the
home she's living in and effectively grants him the possession of both
pieces of property, two homes. ( Tr. p. 21, lines 13 - 15 & A-53).
The Case had degenerated into a case of selling the Salt Lake City
home on 655 H Street, (A-30), fast; at a "Fire Sale" for any price, at that.
Just get the house sold. But nothing was said of selling the other home at
5685 South 3650 West, Bennion; (A-31), where James was living on his U.P
Corporation Pension Plan payment of Three Thousand Ninety Five Dollars
and 72 Cents ($3,095.72) a month; as he was now retired.
Rita sold the home alright, for One Hundred and Eighteen Thousand
Dollars ($118,000).

She had two appraisals of over Two Hundred Thousand

Dollars ($200,000) each.

But, with pressure from the Court she could not

wait longer for the right buyer., a potential loss of over Eighty Thousand
Dollars ($80,000).
The court ordered appellant to move in the unreasonable time of ten
days and finally presented an unfair dilemma to the appellant, either
move or else
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VIII:

THE CONDUCT OF THE TRIAL JUDGE CONSTITUTES

JUDICIAL BIAS.
The transcript begins:
Salt Lake City, Utah; Wednesday, July 11, 1990 (3:00 P.M.)
The Court: Do yow think we are going to finish this by five
o'clock? (Tr.. p. 1, lines 20 - 21). [Emphasis added].
Mr. Richman:
Q

(By Mr. Spafford)

Oh, sure.
Let me put it this way.

Where would

you go if you moved out?
A.

I don't have anyplace to go.

[Emphasis added].

The Court: That's immaterial.

[Emphasis added].

Mr. Spafford:

It goes to the issue of contempt, your Honor.

The court: Let's find out why she doesn't move out, not where
she's going to go. [Emphasis added].
Q

(By Mr. Spafford)

Why haven't you moved out?

A.
I don't have anyplace to go. I don't have anv money to go
anyplace. (Tr. p. 20, lines 2 -13 & A-52). [Emphasis added].
The Court: We're going to waste a lot of time here. I can sort it
out. I told vou in the first instance I'm inclined to have her move out of
the house: They haven't shown me any reason why she shouldn't be out.
So, I'm not convinced that the fact that she hasn't any place to go is any
reason that I should not enforce the order. So, you know— (Tr. p. 25, lines
16 -22 & A-54). [Emphasis added].
Had the court not decided the issue before hearing the testimony,
and was not willing to take the time to hear the testimony?

Can a court

make an unbiased and unprejudiced decision without weighing the
testimony of moving a person out of their home against their rights under
the 14th Amendment of Section 1 of the United States Constitution?
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In a similar case, the Utah Supreme Court stated:
We offer the general philosophy expressed in Haslam v.
Morrison, 113 Utah 14, 190 P.2d 520. 523 (1948) Justice
Wolfe, writing for the court, stated: The purity and integrity of
the judicial process ought to be protected against any taint of
suspicion to the end that the public and litigants may have the
highest confidence in the integrity and fairness of the courts.1
Justice Wade in a concurring opinion stressed this point when
he wrote: 'One of the most important things in government is
that all persons subject to its jurisdiction shall always be able
to maintain a fair and impartial trial in all matters of litigation
in the courts. It is nearly as important that the people have
absolute confidence in the integrity of the courts. I can think
of nothing that would as surely bring the courts into disrepute
as for a judge to insist on trying a case when one of the
litigants believes that such judge is biased and prejudiced
against him'." Marchant v. Marchant 743 P.2d 199 (Utah App.
1987),
It is respectfully urged that the foregoing conduct constitutes judicial
bias and an error in law and should not be condoned by this Court.
CONCLUSION
The trial court erred in awarding a mutual Decree of Divorce, (A-22).
By not awarding Rita permanent alimony the trial court erroneously
failed to maintain the wife's standard of living at least to the level of when
the parties were living on a retirement income, and also there is a great
disparity between the parties in terms of education and earning capacity.
In addition, the trial court's Findings were fatally defective in that
they did not address the wife's ability to support herself or contain the
necessary financial facts to support the no alimony award.
be awarded to Rita.
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Alimony should

The child support should be modifyed as the law allows and a
reasonable amount of child support be allotted to maintain the children's
standard of living,
Rita should be awarded a fair and equitable division of marital
property.
In not making an award of attorney's fees, the trial court failed to
consider the ability of Rita to pay those fees.

Rita's disposable income is

far less than James' as well as being less stable.

In addition, she was

awarded no property to which she could look to satisfy the fee.
The Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, (A-ll), and Decree of
Divorce, (A-22), should be modified to be consistent with the evidence and
the law.
Appellant would respectfully request that the relief requested as set
forth in RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL, P. 20, be granted and that she be
awarded her Attorney fees and expenses incurred in connection with the
court trial and this appeal.
Respectfully submitted this 11th day of February, 1991.

yfyjg>

d. \A^y

Rita C. Gum
In propria persona
Plaintiff- Appellant
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RICHMAN & RICHMAN
Attorney for Defendant - Respondent
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H. DELBERT WELKER, of counsel (3418)
SPAFFORD & SPAFFORD
A Professional Corporation
425 East 100 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801) 363-1234
Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
oooOooo
RITA B. GUM,
Plaintiff,

VERIFIED COMPLAINT

vs.

Civil No.

JAMES RICHARD GUM,
Defendant.

Honorable ^ d ^ J ^

^0^90/0(0%
*

&>h

oooOooo

COMES NOW plaintiff, and for cause of action allege the
following:
1.

Plaintiff is a resident of Salt Lake County, State of

Utah and has so resided for three months prior to the
commencement of this action•
2.

The parties were married in salt Lake County, State

of Utah on March 24, 1982.
3.

Plaintiff is the mother of two minor children who

were adopted by defendant and are considered to be issue of the
marital relationship.
to wit: Amy Charmaine Gum (DOB 3/14/75) and Joy Charmaine Gum
(DOB 9/22/76)
4.

The parties have been unable to settle the marital

differences resulting in the termination of the marriage due to
irreconcilable differences,
5.

Plaintiff is a fit and proper parent who should be -,

awarded the care, custody and control of the minor children
subject to defendant's reasonable visitation.
6.

Defendant should be ordered to pay child support

payments to plaintiff in an amount computed from the Child
Support Guidelines on the worksheet attached hereto.
7.

The parties have acquired a home which should be sold

and the net proceeds divided equally.
8.

During the marriage relationship, the parties have

acquired investments which should be equitably divided.
9.

Plaintiff is entitled to retirement income from

defendant's employment when she is age 60, said retirement should
be ordered by the Court.
10.

The parties have acquired various items of personal

property which should be equitably divided.
11.

All marital debts prior to separation should be

assumed and paid by defendant.
12.

Plaintiff should pay for her vehicle and bank card.

13.

Defendant should maintain all health, accident and

life insurance policies preserving the currently named
beneficiaries until the youngest child reaches age 18.
14.

Defendant should continue to pay all health

insurance premiums for the minor children and all uninsured
medical, dental and optometric expenses of the minor children
should be split equally by the parties.

15.

Defendant should be ordered to pay plaintiff's

attorneys' fees for being forced to file this action.
16.

Alimony of $1.00 per year should be awarded to

plaintiff.
WHEREFORE, plaintiff should be awarded a decree of
divorce from defendant on the following terms and conditions:
1.

Plaintiff should be awarded custody and child support

of the minor child subject to reasonable visitation with
defendant.
2.

The parties' home should be sold and the net proceeds

should be split equally.
4.

Defendant should assume all marital debts except for

plaintiff's vehicle and bankcard.
5.

Defendant should maintain all insurance policies with

the same beneficiaries until the youngest child is age 18; he
should also provide health insurance coverage for the minor
children and all uninsured medical, dental and optometric
expenses of the minor children shall be split equally by the
parties.
6.

Defendant should pay plaintiff's attorneys' fees for

having to prosecute this action.
7.

Alimony of $1.00 per year should be awarded to

plaintiff.
Dated this

9

day of

'T??asu^^

1990.

/?-j
/SJ2^S

^7//>I^

^

Subscribed and Sworn to before me this £
1990.

day of

Notary Public
Residing at Salt Lake County
Commission Expires
3/28/92

H. Delbert Welker
Attorney for Plaintiff

/1-4

Glen M. Richman, (2752)
RICHMAN & RICHMAN
Attorneys for Plaintiff
60 South 600 East, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, UT 84102
Telephone: (801) 532-8844
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

TRIAL BRIEF

RITA B. GUM,
Plaintiff,
vs .

Civil No. D90-4901065
Judge John A. Rokich

JAMES RICHARD GUM,
Defendant.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND
1.
his
a

Defendant, James R. Gum purchased

a home in 1970

with

first wife who passed away during their marriage, making him
widower (that marriage lasted

years.

The

defendant.

marriage
The

to plaintiff

marriage

is

twenty seven (27)

a second

having occurred

Subsequent to that marriage,
relationship; have

in excess of

on

marriage

March 24,

the parties have had a

been separated numerous times

amended
31st

of

The cases were filed

complaint October 12,

and have filed

October,

1988 and

March 26, 1987.

1988.

the

action

one case

There was an

Another complaint

current

1982.

very stormy

three separate divorce actions against one another, and
was amended.

for

on the

was filed

by

plaintiff on the 8th day of March, 1990.
2.

The parties have not lived together since the filing of

the last complaint.
3.

The defendant has been

represented by Debbie Hann, Del

Welker, James Medlin and Earl Spafford and now represents herself
after

Mr.

Spafford's

late withdrawal.

A

Notice

to Appoint

Successor Counsel occurred on the 31st day of July, 1990.
4.

This

present

plaintiff, Rita B.

marriage is

Gum.

Both

a

third

marriage for

of her former marriages

the

ended in

divorce.
5.

Plaintiff has

marriages,

four (4) children

by one of

which were adopted by defendant.

children are minors; Amy,

her former

Two of said adopted

born March 14, 1975, age 15 1/2 years,

and Joy, born September 22, 1976, age 14 years.
6.

The

Court issued

an

requiring plaintiff to vacate
20th

day

During

an

of May,
Order to

1990.

order and

reaffirmed the

defendant's home on or

Plaintiff

Show Cause

and

ignored that
Motion for

Scheduling Conference, the Court reaffirmed

order

before the
court order.

Management and

that the

should be removed from the home within ten (10) days.

plaintiff
Plaintiff

ignored that order.
7.

The home has

available for a

now been

sold and the

determination by

2

the Court as

net proceeds

are

to division, if

any .
8.

Defendant

is retired,

has had

open heart

surgery in

1987; is a serious diabetic and must receive insulin.
9.

Plaintiff is employed and is also a diabetic.

10.

Plaintiff placed

issue during
subpoena
doctors.
parte

her physical and

her deposition

was

issued for

Plaintiff,

protective

on the

order

25th day of

a records

through her
quashing

mental condition in

deposition

then
the

May, 1990.
for two

counsel obtained
deposition

A

of her
an ex

notices

and

requiring the expense of obtaining them at a later date.
11.

There

are

Interrogatories

that

were

forwarded

to

plaintiff prior to the withdrawal of her counsel, Earl Spafford.
Said Interrogatories bear the

date of the 10th of July, 1990 and

plaintiff has made no response.
12.

Defendant made a Request for Production of Documents on

the 10th day

of July,

1990 while plaintiff

was represented

by

counsel and there has been no production whatsoever .
13.

Defendant

made certain Demands

for Admissions of Fact

on July 10, 1990, while plaintiff was represented by counsel, and
there has been no response.
14.

When

plaintiff vacated the home and

during the month of August, 1990, she
all

removed from the home most

of the parties' personal property items

3

the home was sold

which were located

A

therein,
hereto

including the

as Exhibit A to

defendant's premarital
this Trial Brief is a

items.

Annexed

copy of the items

taken from the home with an identification of those items left in
the home,

and with

defendant's estimated

fair market value of

said items.
ISSUES JTO. BE..RESOLVED
1.
the

Custody

children

may

is not an issue. The parties have agreed that
reside

with

whichever

party

they

desire

(apparently the children desire to live with the plaintiff).
2.

The

defendant

is

accordance with the Uniform

willing

to pay

child

support

in

Child Support Guidelines. Defendant

is also willing to provide hospital and medical insurance through
his former employer for the benefit of said children during their
minority to age 18 years.
3.

The

defendant

is

willing

to

divide

equally

any

retirement earned during the parties' marriage or accruing during
the parties* marriage.
4.

With

position that

respect to

the house

the house was

equity, it

his prior

is defendant's

to marriage and

all the

remodeling came from his premarital savings; that the payments on
the mortgage reducing the mortgage during the marriage
his

earnings or

retirement benefits

defendant's position that he should

came from

since retirement.

It is

be awarded all right, title

and

interest in an to all of

the proceeds from the sale of said

home which was ordered sold by the Court.
5.

The

personal

plaintiff at the

property

time she

which

was

vacated the house

removed

by

should be

the

divided

equitably or the values equitably between the parties.
6.

There should be no alimony.

7.

Each party should pay their separate costs and fees.

8.

As appropriate, a withhold

and deliver order should be

entered, if applicable where defendant is retired.
9.
intent

The

Court

in refusing

should
to obey

review

the matter

lawful court

of

orders and

plaintiff's
requiring

added expense in court appearances in this action.
DATED this

(o

day of September, 1990.

RICHMAN & RICHMAN

•GLEN M. RICHMAN
Attorney for Defendant

R

A~<*

CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY

GLEN M. RICHMAN hereby certifies that he delivered a true
and correct copy of the foregoing Trial Brief to plaintiff, Rita
B. Gum, by personally delivering the same to her this 6th day of
September, 1990.

DATED this

fc?

day of September, 1990.

RICHMAN & RICHMAN

GLEN M. RICHMAN
Attorney for Defendant
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Glen M. Richman, (2752)
RICHMAN & RICHMAN
Attorneys for Plaintiff
60 South 600 East, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, UT 84102
Telephone: (801) 532-8844
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

RITA B. GUM,

)
)
)

Plaintiff,
vs.

)
)
)

JAMES RICHARD GUM,
Defendant.

The
John
1990.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Civil No. D90-4901065
Judge John A. Rokich

)

above matter came for

A. Rokich in
Plaintiff

trial before the Honorable Judge

his courtroom
appearing

in

on the
person

attorney having withdrawn effective
Notice

6th day
pro

se,

the 30th day of

of September,
her

previous

July, 1990;

to Appoint Successor Counsel having been made on the 31st

day of July, 1990, and the

plaintiff having made it known to the

Court by filing a pro se pleading that she desired
matter without other

counsel.

The defendant

and through his attorney, Glen M. Richman.

to pursue her

appeared in person
Extensive discussion

occurred

between the

Court

and the

plaintiff and

defendant's

counsel, and certain agreements were made and stipulated into the
record

pertaining to all issues in this action and the defendant

was sworn

and gave

testimony in

support

establish

jurisdiction, residency,

and

of his

cause and

the Court

being

to

fully

advised in the premises now makes and enters its
FINDINGS „0F FACT
1.

Each

of the parties are actual and bona fide residents

of Salt Lake County, State of

Utah, and were for more than three

months immediately preceding the commencement of this action.
2.

Plaintiff

married in

and defendant are

Salt Lake County, State

wife and

husband, having

of Utah, on the

24th day of

March, 1982.
3.

There

are no children

born as issue

of the marriage.

Four children of plaintiff by a previous marriage were adopted by
defendant.

Two

of said children are minors; namely

Amy C. Gum,

born March 14, 1975 and Joy C. Gum, born September 22, 1976.
4.
arisen

During

the

marriage, irreconcilable

causing the parties to

unworkable

and

irreconcilable

grow apart and
through

their

differences have
make the marriage
quarrelling

and

2
/)-/*

disagreements.
5.

Defendant

plaintiff and

thereon
from

a

widower

prior to

his

had certain premarital property,

located at 655
remodeled

was

H Street, Salt

subsequent to the

in addition to payment

defendant's

premarital

savings.

Said home

a mortgage

of some of

to

including a home

Lake City, Utah.

marriage and

marriage

was

was taken

the remodeling costs

The

home

was sold

in

August, 1990 and after selling costs, produced an approximate net
equity of $10,000.00.
6.

The parties

have each expressed a desire

minor children to be in the general
whichever party they desired

to allow the

care, custody and control of

and under present circumstances the

children have selected the plaintiff.
7.

The

defendant

is

retired

from

the

Union

Pacific

Railroad; had heart surgery in 1987 and is a serious diabetic and
must take insulin.
his former

He has pension and retirement

employer,

$3,095.72.

and

his

income

from

those

programs from
sources

is

Defendant is 59 years of age, his birthday being the

fifth day of January, 1931.
8.

The plaintiff is 53

years of age, having been

born on

the 20th day
Hotel

of January, 1937.

and earns on the

earnings
thirty

She is

employed at the

average of $563.60

Hilton

(computed from gross

of $4,422.10 through the pay period August 26, 1990, or
$130.06 per

four (34) weeks, averaging

week,

52 weeks

equals annual earnings of $6,763.21, or $563.60 per month.)
9.

The

Uniform

parties' combined monthly income is $3,659.00; the

Child Support

$653.00.

Schedules

Defendant's

plaintiff's

for two

income

is 15%. Defendant

is

85%

children provide
of

should pay to

said

figure

for
and

the plaintiff the

sum of $555.00 per month, or $277.00 per month per child for each
of

the minor children during their minority to age eighteen (18)

years, or until earlier emancipation.
10.
through

Defendant
his

former

has hospital and medical insurance available
employer

for

the

benefit

of

the

minor

children.
11.
agreed
items
Decree
and

The parties have divided
before the Court on the

by plaintiff

certain items of property and

record, to the return of certain

to the defendant

on or before

entry of the

on the 10th day of September, 1990, including the Llardro

porcelain having

a value

of $600.00; defendant's oriental

4
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sword having a value of $150.00; his 30-06 hunting rifle having a
value of $350.00
The

and his

binoculars having a

balance of the personal property

remain

with the parties as

property.

The plaintiff

value of $75-00.

as presently divided shall

divided and shall

be their separate

having in her possession the

king size

bed, two night stands, two bed lamps, a table lamp, a swag light,
a dresser with mirror, a lamp table, a swivel rocker, a lounge, a
vanity,

a vanity chair, two

Panasonic
mirrors,

TV, a TV stand,
a

bedspread, a

dresser lamps, two

vanity lamps, a

three wall pictures, two night stand
twin bed,

a

dresser with

mirror, an

additional night stand with bed lamp, dresser lamp, a vanity from
the front bedroom and a vanity bench, a baby grand piano, a Sanyo
TV, a gold curio

cabinet, two plant stands, a dining room table,

china cabinet, three chairs, coffee
pans,

dishes, silverware,

cuisineart;

maker, a toaster, three

pots,

pans, cooking

fry

utensils,

from the downstairs bedroom, a twin bed, a desk with

bookshelf, night

stand,

hope chest, desk chair,

dresser with

mirror , lingerie

three pictures, bed lamp,

dresser,

two dresser

lamps; from the family room a sofa, love seat, entertainment

5
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center, VCR, computer, printer and table, coffee table, glass top
table,

Zenith TV,

dryer;

from

oil; from

the utility

miscellaneous items, the

vacuum cleaner, an upright

room, the

vacuum

washer and

cleaner, a

hand

piano, a telephone answering machine,

a sewing machine, rowing machine, garden hose.
12.
swag

The defendant

light, a

rocker,

has in his

recliner; from

possession a clock

the living

room, a

radio, a

sofa, swivel

two end tables, coffee table, a stereo, two table lamps;

from the dining room,

six dining room chairs; from

the kitchen,

dishes, silverware, pots and pans, Farberware, an oak table; from
the family room, an oil still life, a desk and desk chair, a wall
clock, a cuckoo
utility
mower,

clock, a mantle clock and a

room a file cabinet;
garden

desk lamp; from the

from miscellaneous items, the lawn

tools, carpenter

tools, fishing

gear,

golf

equipment, ladder, barbecue and patio furniture.
13.

The parties have

agreed to share

copies of a

picture

album.
14.

The parties agreed that the plaintiff would be paid the

sum of Three Thousand Dollars from
the

home

upon the

date

of entry

6

the proceeds
of

of the

the Decree

sale of

provided the

plaintiff has returned the Llardro, the hunting rifle, the
and the binoculars;

and that

property identified which have
all

except for the

sword

personal items of

been divided between the parties,

other property of the defendant would remain as his sole and

separate property,

including his pension,

savings, and

benefit

plans and all personal property in his possession.
15.

The parties agreed that no alimony

would be awarded to

either party.
16.

The

parties

children would be
Schedules and that

agreed that

the

in accordance with
there is no reason

support

for the

minor

the Uniform Child

Support

for the Court to

deviate

therefrom .
17.

The

parties

agreed

that

each would

pay

for

their

respective attorney's fees and costs.
18.

The parties agreed that

the minor children as
the taxable year
he is current
calendar

dependents for income tax

1990 and each taxable year

purposes during

thereafter provided

on his child support obligation at

year

plaintiff's

the defendant would be awarded

and provided

earnings are

further that

sufficient

7

at

that she

the end of the

such time

as the

could receive

a

benefit

from claiming one of

she should be entitled

the children as

a dependent, that

to claim the oldest of the minor children

as a dependent for income tax purposes during

that year and each

succeeding

to her

saving.

year when

it would be

a benefit

from a tax

The plaintiff should be required to execute and deliver

any Internal Revenue Service form required to allow the defendant
to

claim

the

children as

dependents

for

tax purposes,

both

federal and state.
19.

It

was agreed

children be paid

that the

child support

to the plaintiff by

for the

the defendant in

minor

one lump

sum each month on or before the 5th day of each month.
20.

The parties agreed that

debts and obligations

incurred subsequent to

separation on March 8, 1990,
their separate
that

each

each should pay their separate
the date of

that each party is required to

obligation for their respective

would

thereon, and that

hold the

their

other

harmless

incurred during the course of the

automobiles, and

from any

defendant would pay the debts

pay

liability

and obligations

marriage up to the date of the

parties ' separation.

8
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From the foregoing Findings of Fact the Court now makes its
CONCLUSIONS OF„LAW
1.

Defendant is entitled and should be awarded a Decree of

Divorce upon the grounds

of irreconcilable differences, the same

to become final upon entry.
2.

The

general care,

custody

and control

of the

minor

children at present should be awarded to the plaintiff subject to
reasonable

rights

of

visitation

in

the

defendant

at

all

reasonable times and places.
3.

The personal

property of the parties

presently divided with the exception

should remain as

of the 30-06 hunting rifle,

the binoculars, the oriental sword and the Llardro in plaintiff's
possession which should be returned to the defendant on or before
the date of the entry of the Decree, September 10, 1990.
4.

The

plaintiff

should

Thousand

Dollars ($3,000.00)

proceeds

from

the sale

be

awarded the

representing her

of the

parties'

sum

of

Three

interest in

home, subject

the

to her

return of the sword, rifle, binoculars and Llardro.
5.
the sole

All other property not previously divided shall
and separate property

of the defendant,

9

remain

including his

pension,
former

savings, thrift

employer;

his

and/or
savings

other benefit
and

any

plans with

premarital

his

property

presently in his possession.
6.
the

The support for

defendant to

the minor children

plaintiff in

one lump

the month,

should be paid

sum each

month on

or

the month

of

before the

5th day of

September,

in the sum of Two Hundred Seventy Seven ($277.00) per

child, per

month.

Said

beginning with

by

support

shall

continue

during

the

debts

and

minority of each child to age eighteen (18) years.
7.

Neither party should be awarded alimony.

8.

Each

party

should

pay

their

separate

obligations incurred subsequent to the parties' separation
8,

1990, and

liability

each

thereon.

shall

hold

the

other

harmless

assume and discharge the

marital

The defendant should

debts and obligations incurred

prior to the parties' separation on March 8, 1990,
to

hold

any

Each party is required to pay their separate

obligation for their respective automobile.

required

from

March

the

plaintiff harmless

from

and should be
any

liability

thereon .
9.

Each party should pay their separate costs and fees.

10

10.

The defendant

as dependents
19^0

for income

and each

provided he is

taxable

should be allowed to
tax purposes

during the

year thereafter

current at the

claim the children
taxable year

during their

end of the

minority,

calendar year on

his

child support obligation, and provided further, that in the event
there

is a

benefit

by tax

saving

to the

plaintiff from

her

increased earnings in the future, then in that year and each year
in which she would receive a
one

of the

tax savings and benefit by claiming

children, then she

oldest of the minor

should be

allowed to

children as a dependent for

claim the

that particular

tax year
11.
and

The defendant

should be required

medical insurance for the

to maintain hospital

benefit of the

minor children so

long as the same is available to him through his former employer.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.
DATED this

day of September, 1990.
BY THE COURT:

JOHN A ROKICH
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

11
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6cP 10
Glen M. Richman, (2752)
RICHMAN & RICHMAN
Attorneys for Plaintiff
60 South 600 East, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, UT 84102
Telephone: (801) 532-8844

£y.
Leputy Clerk

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, S T A T E O^ UTAH

RITA &. GUM,
DECREE OF DIVORCE
Plaintiff ,
vs .
Civil No. D90-4901065
Judge John A. Rokich

JAMES RICHARD GUM,
Defendant.

THE ABOVE MATTER came

on for hearing before the

Court, the

Honorable Judge John A. Rokich in his courtroom on the 6th day of
September, 1990.
appearing
Court
with

in person and through

having had
defendant

entered

Plaintiff appearing in person pro se, defendant
counsel, Glen M.

extensive discussions
through

his

with the

counsel, and

into a stipulation on

Richman.

the

the record, the

plaintiff and
parties

being advised in

the premises

having

same having been

read into the record and having been affirmed by the
the Court

The

and having

parties and
heretofore

S)

As*-*

made and entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,
NOW THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as
follows-"

the

p^W^/J?*Defendant 4&- hereby

grounds

awarded

of irreconcilable

^^
a Decree of

differences,

to

'A<eDivorce upon
be final

upon

entry.
2.

The plaintiff

custody and control
and

liberal

rights

is awarded

presently the general

of the minor children subject
of

visitation

in

the

care,

to reasonable

defendant

at

all

reasonable times and places.
3.

The

consistent

defendant

is

ordered

to

pay

with the Uniform Child Support

child

support

Guidelines in the sum

of Two Hundred Seventy Seven ($277.00) per month per child during
the minority of each child

to age eighteen (18) years, or

earlier

same to

month on

emancipation; the
or before

the 5th

be paid

in one

their

payment per

of each

month, beginning

ordered

to

with the

month of September, 1990.
4.

The

defendant

is

maintain hospital

medical insurance through his former employer for the benefit

and
of

the minor children during the minority of each.

Zl

<n •*

5.

Neither party is awarded alimony.

6.

The

plaintiff is

awarded

Dollars ($3,000.00), representing
from

the

sale

($3,000.00) is

of
to

the

home.

be paid

to

the sum

her interest
The
her on

September , 1990 provided the Decree
provided further that

Three
or

of Three

Thousand

in the

proceeds

Thousand

Dollars

before the

is entered on

she has returned

10th

of

said day and

the oriental sword,

the

30-06 hunting rifle, the binoculars and Llardro to the defendant.
7.

With the exception of

the Llardro, binoculars, the 30-

06 and oriental sword, the personal property of the parties shall
remain as presently divided and
Findings

of

Fact.

The four

returned by the plaintiff

as indicated specifically in the
items

mentioned herein

shall be

to the defendant on or before the 10th

day of September, 1990. Upon the return of said items, the Three
Thousand Dollars ($3,000.00) as above indicated shall be released
to her.
8.
marital

The defendant
debts of

the

is ordered

to assume and

parties incurred

prior

discharge the

to the

parties'

separation March 8, 1990. However, each party is required to pay
their separate obligation for

their respective automobile.
3

Each

4-2«t

of

the parties is ordered to assume and discharge their separate

debts

and

obligations

separation date of

incurred

by

March 8, 1990,

each

Each is

subsequent

to

the

required to hold the

other harmless from any liability on the debts each is ordered to
assume and discharge.
9.

Each party shall pay their separate costs and fees.

10.

The

defendant

shall be

allowed

to

claim the

minor

children as dependents for income tax purposes during the taxable
year 1990 and each taxable
minority provided
at the end

year thereafter during the children's

he is current on his

of the calendar year ,

plaintiff's

child support obligation

and provided further that

earnings are insufficient to allow

a benefit to her

by claiming one of the minor children as a tax dependent.
event in the future plaintiff's earnings are
may

the

In the

sufficient that she

benefit by a tax saving by claiming one of the children as a

dependent for income

tax purposes,

then she may

be allowed

to

claim the oldest of the two minor children during that particular
year and

each year

in

which that

event

is applicable.

The

plaintiff is required to execute and deliver to the defendant any
and all

IRS and tax forms

necessary for him to

4

claim the minor

children as dependents for income tax purposes.
11.
all

Each party

is ordered to

execute and deliver

documents necessary to accomplish the

any and

purposes and work the

intent of the Court's Decree.
12.

The

defendant

property, free from any
right, interest

is awarded

as

his

sole and

claim or interest in the

and entitlement pertaining to

separate

plaintiff, all

his benefit plans

through his former employment, including retirement plans, thrift
plans, savings, stock plans or any benefit plan whatsoever.

DATED this

/&

day of September, 1990.
BY THE COURT:
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RITA C. GUM

Thi;* -_
-!^lolCT
bAL
' • - -U-HTY

Plaintiff and Appellant
1034 East 900 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84105
Telephone: (801) 532-1291

BY
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
oooOooo
RITA C. GUM
NOTICE OF APPEAL
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs .
Civil No.

D90-4901065

JAMES RICHARD GUM
Judge John A. Rokich
Defendant and Appellee.
•oooOooo1. Notice is hereby given that plaintiff and appellant Rita
C. Gum, representing herself, appeals to the Utah Court of Appeals
the final Decree of Divorce of the Honorable John A. Rokich
entered in this matter on the 6th day of September, 1990.
2.

The appeal is taken from the following numbered

paragraphs of the Decree of Divorce:
Paragraph 1.

Plaintiff and Defendant are hereby

awarded a mutual Decree of Divorce upon the grounds of
irreconcilable differences, to be final upon entry.
Paragraph 3.

The defendant is ordered to pay child

support consistent with the Uniform Child Support
Guidelines in the sum of Two Hundred Seventy Seven
($277.00) per month per child during the minority of

A-zi

each child to the age of eighteen (18) years, or their
earlier emancipation; the same to be paid in one payment
per month on or before the 5th of each month, beginning
with the month of September, 1990.
Paragraph 5.

Neither party is awarded alimony.

Paragraph 6.

The plaintiff is awarded the sum of

Three Thousand Dollars ($3,000), representing her
interest in the proceeds from the sale of the home. The
Three Thousand Dollars ($3,000) is to be paid to her on
or before the 10th of September, 1990 provided the
Decree is entered on said day and provided further that
she has returned the oriental sword, the 30-06 hunting
rifle, the binoculars and Llardro to the defendant.
Paragraph 7.

With the exception of the Llardro,

binoculars, the 30-06 and the oriental sword, the
personal property of the parties shall remain as
presently divided and as indicated specifically in the
Findings of Fact.

The four items mentioned herein shall

be returned by the plaintiff to the defendant on or
before the 10th day of September, 1990.

Upon the return

of said items, the Three Thousand Dollars ($3,000) as
above indicated shall be released to her.
Paragraph 9.

Each party shall pay their separate

costs and fees.
Paragraph 12.

The defendant is awarded as his sole

and separate property, free from any claim or interest

in the plaintiff, all right, interest and entitlement
pertaining to his benefit plans through his former
employment, including retirement plans, thrift plans,
savings, stock plans or any benefit plan whatsoever.

DATED this A Q Z ^ day of (L ('Jt'CU'U'^'

/

. ''SI

, 1990.

L

RITA C. GUM
Plaintiff and Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, certify the forgoing NOTICE OF APPEAL was served on the
Defendant and Appellee this

U?L day of October, 1990, by a true

and correct copy thereof via United States Mail with postage
prepaid thereon to James Richard Gum, 5685 South 3650 West,
Bennion, Utah 84118.

RITA C. GUM

*4 ~

36602-001-13
WHEN RECORDED, MAIL TO:
JAMES R. GUM

6S5 "H" Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103
Malt tax notice to

Grantee

Address

f

3<Jt)3 Jl9

Property

WARRANTY DEED

JAMES R. GUM
of

grin tor

SALT LAKE CITY

CONVEY

County oT

ind WARRANT

SALT LAKE

State of Utah, hereby

to

JAMES R. GUM and RITA C. GUM, husband and wife, as joint tenants
with full rights of survivorship, and not as tenants in co:..mon
framee

of SALT LAKE CITY

County

SALT LAKE

, State of Utah

fortheiumof TEN AND NO/lOOths
AND OTHER GOOD AND VALUABLE CONSIDERATIONS
the following described tract of land in

--

DOLLARS

County,

SALT LAKE

State of Utah, to-wit:

BEGINNING AT THE SOUTHEAST CORNER OF LOT 1, BLOCK 190, PLAT M D M ,
SALT LAKE CITY SURVEY, AND RUNNING THENCE WEST 5 RODS; THENCE NORTH
55 FEET; THENCE EAST 5 RODS; THENCE SOUTH 55 FEET TO THE PLACE OF
BEGINNING.
SUBJECT TO easements, restrictions and rights of way currently of
record and general property taxes for the year 198* and thereafter.

P
*-"
^
•**

WITNESS the hand of aaid grantor ,thb

29th

Signed in the pretence of

ESTI .

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF

SALT

-:/v«{?/N
fu

X,01Af<I'y \

rt£om
-»2o

GUM

J ss.

LAKE

On the 29thdayof
appeared before me

JUNE

A. D. 19 84 personally

James R, Gum, a m a r r i e d

person

the ligner of the within immimcm who duly acknowledged
to me that ha executed the aame.

Notary Publi
Residing at

ASSOCIATED TITLE COMPANY «»«*«..»» E,«..«—6-33-85".
SALT LAKI 3634909
ATC ttt

r

A.D. 1984

JUNE

day of

2
"So 5

eOUNT»FUtl9i-2400

Oft«Mt244133

PARK CITY SSl-MM

s

Cn

Recorded at Roqueat of.
at

M. Faa Paid $ .
Dap. Book

CO
O

Mail tax notica *»

GRANTEE

S

Paga
KAAr^

Ref.:

5685 S o . 3650 W.
West Valley C i t y , Utah 84118

WARRANTY DEED

£>
^

VAL R. COYERSTONE and TERESE D. C0VERST0NE
of
SALT LAKE CITY
, County of SALT LAKE
CONVEY and WARRANT to

grantor
, State of Utah, haraby

JAMES R. GUM and RITA C. GUM, husband and w i f e , as j o i n t tenants

grantee
for the sum of
-DOLLARS,

of Salt Lake C i t y , County of Salt Lake, State of Utah
TEN AND NO/100 and other good and valuable considerations
the following described tract
State of Utah:

of land in

SALT LAKE

County,

Lot 72, WHITEWOOD ESTATES NO. 2 , according to the o f f i c i a l p l a t thereof, recorded
1n Book 79-2 of Plats t\t Page 48, records of Salt Lake County, Utah.
Subject to a Trust Deed In favor of Western Mortgage Loan Corporation dated
September 4 t h , 1986 In the o r i g i n a l p r i n c i p a l amount of $69,85/.00 which Trust
Deed the grantees herein cssume and agree to pay.
The grantors herein assign to the grantees herein a l l of t h e i r r i g h t , t i t l e
and I n t e r e s t 1n and to the tax and Insurance reserves.

(\y

4515003
28 AUGUST 87
0*i52 Pfl
KATIE L.
DIXON
RECORDERf SALT LAKE COUNTYr UTAH
GUARDIAN TITLE
REC BY* REBECCA GRAY
, DEPUTY

Subject to current general taxes, easements and r e s t r i c t i o n s .
ITNES8, tho hand
WITNE*
ugust
August

of aald grantor

, thla
X * 6 •fc"
, A . D. 19 87

8if nad In tha Praaanca of

Q*y

of

| Xx ^ » - — ^ - — V ^ l t ^ f T.

VAL R. lOVERSTONE

TERESE D. C0VERST0NE
STATE OF TOM, TEXAS

}~

Count/ of

A
ODtht
AC
da/of
"0u*t
ptraonail/ appaarad bafora ma VAL R. C0VERST0NE

tha alffntr

._

"'•.jija
of tha within lnatrumtnt, who duly aoknowladfad to ma OMrt"»-,h^

, A . D. \W
axaoutad tha

Mf opproUtlon. axpli
~»kA*K Of at—mpmAtm a t »

Q OEM PRINT1NO CO — f AI.T kARi f trr

•71131-fl\

WHEN RECORDED, MAIL TO:
RONNIE PAUL MCNEVIN
655 NORTH "H" STREET
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH

Space Above for Recorder's Use

84103

Warranty Deed
JAMES R. GUM and RITA C. GUM, husband and wife, as 3oint tenants with full
rights of survivorship, and not as tenants in common
, County of

of
hereby CONVEY

and WARRANT

, State of Utah,

to

RONNIE PAUL MCNEVIN, an unmarried man

TEN DOLLARS AND OTHER VALUABLE CONSIDERATIONS
the following described tract

, State of Utah for the sum of

County of SALT LAKE

of 655 NORTH "H" STREET
SALT LAKE CITY

of land in

*************************************

SALT LAKE

County, State of Utah, to-wit

BEGINNING at the Southeast corner of Lot 1, Block 190, PLAT "D",
S a l t Lake City, Survey, and running thence West 5 Rods; thence
North 55 f e e t ; thence East 5 Rods; thence South 55 f e e t t o the
Place of BEGINNING.

WITNESS the hand

of said grantor

.this 24TH

day of

AUGUST

1990

Signed in the presence of

•It

& ~

AMES R. GUM

RITA C. GUM
STATE OF UTAH,

)
)»s.

County of

)

On the
day of
, 1990
,
personally appeared before me
JAMES R. GUM and RITA C. GUM, husband and w i f e , as j o i n t t e n a n t s w i t h f u l l
r i g h t s of s u r v i v o r s h i p , and not as t e n a n t s i n common
the signer s of the above instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that THEY executed the same

Notary Public
My Commission expires

Residing in_
APPROVED FORM - UTAH SECURITIES COMMISSION

/)-3X

ROBERT K. MADDOCK, JR., M.D., F.A.C.P.
Internal Medicine & Kidney Diseases
1002 EAST SOUTH TEMPLE
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH

84102

Telephone (801) 521-7787

3/25/87

Re: Rita C. Gum
To whom it may concern:
Mrs. Rita Gum has reported to me several injuries which she states were
caused by her husband. On 3/25/87 she came to the office with a bruised
L. foot. X-ray at Holy Cross Hospital revealed a fracture of proximal
phalanyx of 5th left toe. This occured on 3/24/87 in scuffle with husband.
Mr. Gum is also a patient of mine. He is being followed for the following
medical problems:
1. Diabetes mellitus. insulin requiring
8 U Ultra Lente plus 4 U regular insulin before breakfast
and supper.
2. Atherosclerotic heart disease
a. acute myocardial infarction 1/10/87
b. status post tripple aortocoronary by-pass
2/4/87
According to Mrs. Gum, he has had severe problems controling his anger
since the heart surgery. He also may be having insulin reactions in the
early morning hours as his anger seems greater when he first gets up.
He has been offered help voluntarily, but refuses. Mrs. Gum fears for
the safety of herself and children.
The police have been called on 3 occasions
in the past two months by one of the children, herself and a neighbor to
report violent behavior nn his part according to Mrs. Gum.
Hospitalization may help Mr. Gum in at least two ways. First, to determine
if he is having insulin reactions that may be setting .off his anger. Second,
to determine if recent coronary surgery has set off a severe psychic disturbance
with fear, frustration, and hurt leading to anger outbursts.
It would be better were Mr. Gum to accept hospitalization voluntarily, but he
appears to be not disposed to this idea.

/'. ">
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CARDIOLOGY ASSOCIATES
1002 EAST SOUTH TEMPLE #504
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84102
THOMAS B. KEITH, M.D., P.C., FACC

THOMAS R. CALAME, M.D., P.C., FACC

(801) 350-4628

(801) 350-4629

November 2, 19 89

Rita Gum
655 H Street
Salt Lake City, Utah

84103

To Whom It May Concern:
Rita Gum was a patient at Holy Cross Hospital from 9/22 to 9/30/89.
I saw her in consultation at that time. Mrs. Gum has chest pain,
which is probobly due to mitral valve prolapse, which is present
by physical examination and on echocardiogram. A Thallium stress
test was performed which showed no evidence for ischemic heart disease,
The chest pain, although it is not likely to be due to coronary
artery disease, is none the less quite limiting in terms of her
activities.
In addition to her mitral valve prolapse, the patient has diabetes
melitus, which is treated by Dr. Robert Maddock.
Sincerely yours,

Thomas B. Keith, M.D.
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*EX W. OLSEN, #4895
,EGAL AID SOCIETY OF SALT LAKE
YTTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF
225 SOUTH 200 EAST, SUITE 230
SALT LAKE CITY/ UTAH 8 4 1 1 1
TELEPHONE:
355-4357

In the
Of_

THTRf)
SALT T.AKF,

c

Q\tp.

vs.

A fWVOi^

_ Judicial District Court
County, State of Utah

oOU/YA

vJDGF. RAYMOND S. li$Q

Plaintiff

i^_GQ[kxr\

Ex Parte Protective Order

Defendant

Based upon the verified Complaint on file herein and in response to an Application for Ex Parte Protective Order,
and good cause appearing.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
1. That defendant immediately refrain from causing, attempting to cause, or threatening physical harm to plaintiff.
2. That defendant immediately vacate and refrain from reentering plaintiffs dwelling at ^ddr^ess):

W\.

IZDF)^

firnooV,

< r ^ n

I CLV o

/ /i W i

3. Other deemed appropriate by the Court:

4. That a hearing on plaintiffs Complaint will be held before a judge of the above-entitled Court on the

\Er

day of _ Q o i a h i J C

19 fifl .at the hour of 1Q;3Q A.M.. at the County

Courtroom C,£ 4 0 East 400 South/ Salt Lake City/ Utah.

Courthouse at

5. That plaintiff shall have a copy of this Order together with a copy of the verified Complaint personally served
upon the defendant at least Ciwc (5) days prior to the hearing date.
6. That plaintiff is further ordered to cause a copy of this Order, together with a copy of the proof of service, to be
delivered to the appropriate law enforcement agency.
7. That unless plaintiff appears on the hearing date to show cause why the Ex Parte Protective Order should be
extended, this Order will be automatically dissolved as of such hearing date and time.
NOTE: This Ex Parte Protective Order is issucb! pursuant to the provisions of the Utah Spouse Abuse Act. Section
30-6-1. ct seq.. Utah Code Annotated. 1953 as amended, without bond and without prior notice to the defendant on this
the

f*

. davof.

flriSfX

10 8S"

anhrhiMirnf

I °'' S"2-V.>lnrk

A-

M

VIOLATION BY DEFENDANTOFTHE INJUNCTIONS AND RESTRAINTS IMPOSED BY THIS ORDER
UPON DEFENDANT IS A CRIMINAL OFFENSE CONSTITUTING A CLASS B MISDEMEANOR.

VrTEST

BYTH

ri. DIXON MtNSLEY

s/<7 SA

A-*?

Form No. 3

3X W. OLSEN, 84895
2GAL AID SOCIETY OF SALT LAKE
CTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF
15 SOUTH 200 EAST, SUITE 2 3 0
\LT LAKE CITY, UTAH 8 4 1 1 1
2LEPHONE:
355-4357

THIRD
In the
SALT LAKE
Of.

Judicial District Court
. County, State of Utah

RiVa P.. 0p o - K r \ ,

Summons

Plaintiff

vs.

(\ nm_oXb

R ^

(Notice of Application for Protective Order)

ouurm

Civil No.

Defendant

THE STATE OF UTAH TO T H E ABOVE-NAMED DEFENDANT:
YOU ARE HEREBY notified that a Complaint has been filed with the above-named Court seeking relief against
you pursuant to the provisions of the Utah Spouse Abuse Act. Section 30-6-1. etscq.. Utah Code Annotated. A copy of
the Complaint together with a copy of an Ex Parte Protective Order, if such has been issued, are attached to this
Summons and herewith served upon you.

f\o k^o i\ \9C

You are further notified that a hearing concerning Plaintiffs Complaint will be held on
atthchourof_10£30_
19 88
.M. in the County Courthouse at C o u r t r o o m C, 2 4 0 E . 4 0 0 S . , SLC,
before a Judge of the Court.
You arc required to file an answer in writing to the Complaint with the Clerk of the above-entitled Court prior to the
hearing date and to deliver or mail a copy of your answer to plaintiff. Failure to file such an answer and failure to appear
at the hearing may result in the granting of the relief requested by plaintiff by default.
You may petition the Court for an earlier hearing date if you so desire.
DATED this

7

^

dav of

O

4 r > &>JT

. 19 JE£T

REXVW. OLSEN
Attorney for Plaintiff
Defendant's Address:

Utah Spouse Abuse Act
Form No. 4

W. OLSEN, £4895
^L AID SOCIETY OF SALT LAKE
DRNEY FOR PLAINTIFF
SOUTH 200 EAST, SUITE 230
r LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111
3PHONE: 355-4357

In the
Of

Judicial District Court
County, State of Utah

THIRD
SALT T.AKK

Plaintiff
itiff

/

Affidavit of Impecuniosity

o;m<L£>

•

L o i U m
Defendant

)

civi! No.

^

0 <

/ O t ,

5 - 3 */

Sfy

STATE OF UTAH
ss.

COUNTY OF

SAT.T T.AKF
- „ 19

On this

^8 . personally appeared before mc

. who being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says:
(Affiant)
1. I am the plaintiff in the above-described legal action brought pursuant to Utah Code Annotated. Section 30-6-1.
ct scg.
2. I do solemnly swear that owing to my poverty I am unable to bear the expenses of the legal proceedings which I
am about to commence, and that I verily believe I am justly entitled to the relief sought by such legal proceedings.
C^rS
Affiant-Plaintiff

nOAJ\_
...
.
Residing at
n

I .,

Notary Public
S a l e Lake County
±_

/

I

\\\C\

.

LJ\/jL)rt/lQ
(J

My Commission Expires:

A-1Q

Utah Spouse Abuse Act
Form No. 1

x y . OLSE::,
g4895
CAL AID SOCIETY OF SALT LAKE
7CRNEY FOR PLAINTIFF
5 SOOTH 2 0 0 EAST/ SUITE 2 3 0
LT LAKE CITY, UTAH 8 4 1 1 1
LEPHONE: 3 5 5 - 4 3 5 7

^

'V
In t h e
Of

THIRD
SALT LAKE

Judicial District Court
County, State of Utah

Pw4a . L . foiuno

Complaint

Plaintiff

Civil No.

XI VY^O^

K-

Coijum
Defendant

.IUDGE RAYMOND s. urn

Plaintiff states as follows:
1. This Complaint is filed pursuant to the Utah Spouse Abuse Act, Section 30-6-1, et seq., Utah Code Annotated
(1979).
2. I am a resident of

vDtV V \

v (\ Y^J)

County, State of __

abuse complained of herein took place in .

— .The acts of

. County. State of Utah.

3. Defendant and I arc both adult family members as defined by the Spouse Abuse Act.
4. Defendant and I arc joint parents of the following minor children. (State the names and ages of each child and
with whom that child is presently living):

liCL

-CLin

C^\)JCf\
MJL*T\

5. On or about.

_£L

flfiO

IQIIIA

"?lciin\\?C

Jd.
cfendant attempted to cause, or intentionally

or knowingly caused, mc physical harm, and/or intentionally placed mc in fear of imminent physical harm.
(Specifically describe act(s) of abuse):

f\tt\cV
S K a V.i JY\.A CCL£ niAJ)r. ^Jr ; V GQA'.M -k\
J1LS U \ a ) r Wo vhVTn(M L k o , Jr> VT i 0 0 p n 0 -

A-A.O

CtJKxtu**;t-i* uciuio^d <M . Tinic^^ii: ^r.'jicr ir.ut ueiendaiu wiii continue 10 aouse me M\
. P X I O I bciiomj: this arc (describe):

rtn/i

Ainu

A MID

LO'CUA

ry\

jrc\

Q

^ a o ^aft-A-

7. I ask this Court to immediately issue an Ex Parte Protective Order, without notice to defendant, restraining and
ljoining defendant as follows (check and fill in appropriate spaces):
A. Prohibiting defendant from causing, attempting to cause or threatening physical harm to
me.
f\

B. Ordering defendant to immediately vacate my dwelling at (address):

UP) 6
p

U •

5^-tn o o \

:

> 5 a M LpJ^

Oil IA ,(1 in \,

C. Ordering defendant to refrain from entering my dwelling at (address):

8. I further ask this Court to set a date and lime, within the next ten days, for further hearing on this Complaint.
9. At that hearing, I ask the Court to issue an Order of Protection granting me the following relief (check and fill in
I spaces that apply):
X
A. Prohibit defendant from causing, attempting to cause or threatening physical harm to me.
A

B. Order defendant to vacate by dwelling at (address):

Y

C. Order
defendant to
to retrain
refrain irom
from entering
entering by
by dwelling
dwelling at
at (address):
(address):
dcr dcicndant

/^

D. Orderdefcndant tn pay m<Mrmpnrary <:nppnrt in fhramnnnt nfS

X

fj /0£) 0 ' ^p<rmnn(h

E. Order defendant to pay my court costs; and r e a s o n a b l e a t t o r n e y ' s

fees.

F. Order defendant to pay medical expenses incurred and other damages suffered as a result of
the abuse.
O. Other relief as the Court deems appropriate:

WHEREFORE- I ask the Court to grant me relief as follows: (check apropriatc spaces)
X
I. Set a date and time, within the next ten days, for a hearing on this Complaint, which shall be
_ . 19 § §

at thrhntirnf 1 0 : 3 0 A. M

2. Issue an immediate Ex Parte Protective Order granting me the rclicfasked for in paragraph seven above.
3. After the hearing on the Complaint, issue a Protective Order granting me the relief asked for in
aragraph nine above.
%

4. Grant such other and further relief as the Court deems just and equitable.

Dated this

ZfJjLs

7 ? / / / J /<? (Iu.

/S •

>&JsrfLs

Plaintiff

Verification
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF

Salt

On this
(Name of Plaintiff)

Lake

ss.
day of .

— , personally appeared before mc

a notary public, who being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says that she/he is the

plaintiff in the above-entitled matter; that she/he has read the Complaint, and that the allegations set forth therein arc
rue and correct of her/his own information and knowledge, and that she/he believes she/he is entitled to the relief
Draycd for, and that said legal action is not instigated for harrassment, abuse of process or delay.
r--^

Plaintiff

4^/)&njx

» i

I..- Wuyf-OCMld

Notary Public

Residing at

S a l t Lake County

My Commission Expires:

Seal)

,
*

:X W. OLSEN, #4895
,GAL AID SOCIETY OF SALT LAKE
TORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF
5 SOUTH 200 EAST, SUITE 230
LT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111
LEPHONE: 355-4357

In the
Of_

Utah Spouse Abuse Act
Form No. 2

_ Judicial District Court
County, State of Utah

THIRD
SALT LAKE

ft;u o.. omum

Application for Ex Parte
Protective Order ,. _ A

Plaintiff

rrc\_

QJYTUIP>

a*HO.2L&2A&I2Y

SA

Defendant
plaintiff in the above-entitled action and pursuant to Utah Code

COMES NOW

Annotated. Section 30-6-5 (2). makes application for an Ex Parte Protective Order immediately restraining and
enjoining defendant as requested in paragraph 7 of the verified Complaint attached hereto and herewith made a part of
this Application.
DATED this

A

.day of.

rtrtt-

/JCCtr^

19

88

l - * &£<VsrrT*-*

Plaintiff

REX W. OLSEN/ AttOi
Attorney for Plaintiff

David P. Coldesina, D.D.S.
Stansbury Apartments
211 South 7th East
Salt Lake City, Utah
General Practice of Dentistry

Phone 355-3151

01/17/91
To Whom It May Concern:
T*f*ct
On or about December 17f 1990. Jcwuy Gum contacted our
office by leaving a message on our answering machine
stating that he was not responsible for dental treatment
done 12/03/90 and 12/05/90 on Amy Gum without previous
knowledge of her coming in to our office.

We saw Amy

on an emergency basis which is hard to make previous
arrangements with Mr. Gum.

I called Mrs. Gum and explained

this to her and she agreed to pay for services rendered.
Sincerely,

David P. Coldesina office manager/Janet Turner

FF3C
(19030362)
- D r * O a v i d P. C o l d e s m a
P.O.
Box 4 0 3 0
S a l t L a k e C i t y , LT 8 4 1 1 0 - 5 0 3 0

DATE

3 0 DAYS

Bl

BkW ^ 4 1

FIRST PROFESSIONAL SERVICES CORP
1
A
division of First Professional Bank
______

PAYMENTB/CHAPJIESJ

DESCRIPTION

Balance

M i n i m UP. Pmt
STATEMENT DATE

Bl

PATIEfMT

_2/11/90

1 01/02/91

FPSC

is

<S30.-;0
SO DAYS

91 . 0 0

Fcrward

Please
|

Pav

before

OVER SO DAYS

FINANCE CHARGES

EM^^^^^T^^BT^EI

•. CO

91.00
< DETACH HERE AND RETURN BOTTOM STUB WITH REMITTANCE

FPSC
(19030862)
-Dr. David P. Coldesina
P.O. Box 4050
Salt Lak> City, UT 84110-4030

Pa 3e i
* 139T:

•

R i t a Bum
io~:<* E 9 0 0 S
Fenmon*

!

-. t / i ^ / ? l

UT

34103

*1.00

|

lsa,w>i,.
$106

6^ma)M

(lo

J)

M

v^r

9'<2L'^0

~~T$^° CJ^cA

J U ^ > /hJ&* lo&Ssrs QOyaJUj.

7

sTtTMSP

1100 WAUNUT STREET \

'*

34

K

P O BOX 989
OWENSBORO, KY 42302-0989

SERVICE CORPORATION

FC^

PAYMENT

PAY TO
THE ORDER
OF

LF

tbCRu-i

fG

J A i-l L S R
0 UM
I T A C ObM
> 6 c i b SO 3 6 5 0 wEST

btNNION

IOE

MCiUGAGQR

$*4-^<: 0 0 * * 2 , 3 4 5 • 7 5

PAYCE X417732
UT 84118

AMOUNT

*4s/t

VQIO IF NOT CASHED WITHIN 90 DAYS

GOTIABU

IBTOST N A T I O N ^ Si

*

"•awass?" 1 uoa30000s&i: ?m o&S2 a»*
_ i y.1

UJ». . . A , .

* ^

••*,-*

ft8*

,y

SB

*

THIHD DISTHI:T crjRi
SALT LAKE COUNTY
Rita C. Gam
Ko^p90- 4901065
vs
Judge John A. Rockish
James Richard Gum
Supplement to complainfi and
p-rtisl response to Defandt's
Counter offer of July 25. 1990,
My attorneys ha^^withdrawn, and I am so depleted
financially that I am unatle to incur further attorney's
expenses, and therefore choose to represent myself and file
this for myself.
or
1. Divorce ( to eithe? party,/both) :agreed .
2. Castody of children to me (or as they choose)
with liberal an^ coopefative rights of visitation in
accordance with convenience and desire.
3. The family home has been sold; the remainder due
the parties should be divided between the parties ^should
bfee court so decide,and proportions thereof.
4. Surnort m?ney*£or the children in accord with the
guidelines rr-f erred/7 cbr as determined by the court, is
agreeable to mej to be paid through Recovery Services.
5. ICo alimony to either party is likewise agreeble.
6. As to other problems about which the jnay be lack
of understanding or dispute; it is requested'that the
c^urt, after full examination and consideration, resolve
them as his sense of equity and justice dictate*!
I offer full cooperation; but my work is irregular,
only as cplled, so some prior notice is r'esireable
as to any hea: ings I may be required to attend.
Respectfully submitted
Rita C. Gum
I certify that I have fi^e* a copy of the above
? th the court clerk; and have served a copy on the defan^ant, an^ upon his attorney Glen Richman.

w

RICHMAN b RICHMAN
ATTORNEYS AT LAW

Rarbara W. Richman
(of counsel)

60 South 600 East, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
(801)532-8844

Uen M. Richman

July 25,

Mr. Earl S.
Sp&fford
Attorney at Law
425 East First South
Salt Lake City, Utah
Re:

1990

Aflf;' /

84111

Gum vs. Gum

Dear Ear 1:
As you know, I have been out of town for several days.
I
informed
you before leaving
when we discussed
you putting your
client's offer in writing.
This letter is my response to that
offer.
My client may be willing
to pay $3,000.00
whole matter which would include the following:
1.

to resolve

Your client immediately vacating the home;

2.
Executing a deed
in favor of my client
right, title and interest in and to said home;
3.

the /
* *?, \

having

all ^*t*~

Leaving the home in good condition?

4.
Signing
a stipulation
waiving alimony to each party;

and having

the decree

entered

5.
Entering
an order
of support
for the children based
upon the Utah Child
Support Schedule, with
your client
having
custody
of the children with
reasonable rights of visitation in
Mr. Gum;
6.
Your client
would waive all right,
title and interest
in and to any of the retirement or other assets exclusive of
household
items and furniture which
the parties should divide
equi tably;
Each party would pay their separate costs and fees.

A-AB

Mr. Earl S. SpaFford
July 25, 1990
Page Two
I have not discussed
the $3,000.00 amount specifically with
my client, but had previously been authorized to offer $2,000.00
under the same conditions when Mr. Welker was counsel for
the
plaintiff.
I would urge upon my client to increase that offer to
$3,000.00 and
I believe he would
accept that
advice if it is
acceptable to your client. Make no mistake, your client has not
been of-C&red $2,000.00 or $3,000.00 or any number of dollars just
to vacate the house.
If this counter
proposal
is not
acceptable as I have
specified in this letter, please let me know by telephone since I
intend
to press forward
on your Motion for
Rehearing and For a
Stay.
I have been informed that
From the house.

your client has

refused to move ; U

Sincerely yours,
RICHMAN & RICHMAN

GLEN M. RICHMAN
Attorney at Law
GMR 511
cc

J. R. Gum

A - VIO

Page 3

FIVE O'CLOCK.
THE COURT:

LET ME TELL-- LET ME START OUT

RIGHT NOW-- A LOT OF THIS PRELIMINARY STUFF, IT IS A
BENCH TRIAL AND I'M WILLING TO LISTEN TO IT.

SO UNLESS

IT IS SOMETHING OF REAL MATERIAL V A L U E —
MR. SPAFFORD:

I DON'T KNOW WHERE HE'S

GOING, YOUR HONOR, BUT I WANT THE RECORD TO REFLECT
THAT IT IS NOT RELEVANT TO THIS CASE.
THE COURT:

I UNDERSTAND THAT.

IT'S JUST

BACKGROUND INFORMATION; THAT'S ALL.
MR. SPAFFORD:

AS LONG AS THE COURT DOESN'T

TAKE IT FOR ANY OTHER PURPOSE, I HAVE NO PROBLEM.
THE COURT:
BACKGROUND.
TRIAL, FINE.

MOST OF THE CASES GIVE ME

DON'T WORRY ABOUT THAT.

IF IT'S A JURY

THAT'S A DIFFERENT SITUATION.

BUT MY

DECISION IS NOT GOING TO BE MADE ON WHETHER SOMEONE HAS
BEEN MARRIED BEFORE OR NOT.

IT'S WHAT I HAVE BEFORE ME

TODAY.
OKAY.

GO AHEAD.

MR. RICHMAN:
EFFECTIVE, YOUR HONOR.

WELL, YOU SEE THAT HASN'T BEEN
I DON'T WANT THAT.

I WILL

PROFFER TO THE COURT WHAT THIS IS FOR, AND IT IS
RELEVANT TO MR. GUM.
Q.

(BY MR. RICHMAN)

MR. GUM, WHEN YOU WERE

MARRIED TO YOUR FIRST WIFE DID YOU PURCHASE A HOME?

Page 4

A.

YES, I DID.

0.

WHERE IS THAT HOME?

A.

635 H STREET HERE IN SALT LAKE CITY.

Q.

AND WHOSE MONEY DID YOU USE TO PURCHASE

THAT HOME?
A.

MY MONEY.

Q.

AND IS THAT WHERE THE PLAINTIFF IS RESIDING

A.

YES.

0.

WAS THE HOUSE REMODELED AFTER YOU HARRIED

THIS PRESENT WIFE, RITA GUM?
A.

YES, IT WAS.

Q.

AND WHOSE MONEY WAS USED TO REMODEL THE

HOUSE?
A.

MY MONEY.

0.

WAS IT FROM YOUR EARNINGS AT WORK?

A.

EARNINGS, MY EARNINGS.

Q.

AND SAVINGS?

A.

AND SAVINGS.

Q.

AND WAS THERE ANY MONEY AT ANY TIME

PROVIDED TO YOU BY RITA GUM, THE PLAINTIFF IN THIS
ACTION, TO REMODEL OR PURCHASE OR DO ANYTHING TOWARD
THE UPKEEP OF THIS HOUSE?
A.

NONE WHATSOEVER.

Q.

AND THIS IS YOUR THIRD DIVORCE ACTION

Page 20

AND THE ORDER HAD BEEN ENTERED?
Q.

(BY MR. SPAFFORD)

LET ME PUT IT THIS WAY.

WHERE WOULD YOU GO IF YOU MOVED OUT?
A.

I DON'T HAVE ANYPLACE TO GO.
THE COURT:

THAT'S IMMATERIAL.

MR. SPAFFORD:

IT GOES TO THE ISSUE OF

CONTEMPT, YOUR HONOR.
THE COURT:

LET'S FIND OUT WHY SHE DOESN'T

MOVE OUT, NOT WHERE SHE'S GOING TO GO.
Q.

(BY MR. SPAFFORD)

WHY HAVEN'T YOU MOVED

OUT?
A.

I DON'T HAVE ANYPLACE TO GO.

I DON'T HAVE

ANY MONEY TO GO ANYPLACE.
Q.

YOU HAVE A JOB, DON'T YOU?

A.

YES.
MR. RICHMAN:

JUST A MOMENT.

WE WERE NOT

ALLOWED TO GO INTO THESE KINDS THINGS WITH HIM.

HE

DOESN'T HAVE ANY PLACE TO GO EITHER.
THE COURT:

WELL, WHERE SHE GOES IS

IMMATERIAL AS FAR AS I'M CONCERNED.
MR. SPAFFORD:

LET ME MAKE A PROFFER, YOUR

HONOR, TO SAVE A LOT OF TIME.
MY PROFFER IS THAT SHE EARNS LESS THAN $600 A
MONTH; HE EARNS $3,000 MONTH.
HOMES.

THIS COUPLE HAS TWO

THE ONE IS THE EXHIBIT 9-P WHICH IS THE HOME

Page 21

THEY'RE LIVING IN.

IT IS OWNED JOINTLY BY THEM, AND

WHILE ADMITTEDLY IT WAS ACQUIRED PRIOR TO THE MARRIAGE,
DURING THE MARRIAGE FROM MARITAL ASSETS THE HOME WAS
REMODELED.

INDEED IT WAS CONVEYED TO HER JOINTLY WITH

HIM, SO SHE'S HAS AN EQUITABLE INTEREST IN THE
PROPERTY.
THEY HAVE A SECOND PIECE OF PROPERTY IN SALT
LAKE COUNTY, THE LOT " 2 , WHITEWOOD ESTATES, ANOTHER
HOME WHICH IS ALSO DEEDED TO THE TWO PARTIES

JOINTLY.

MR. GUM HAS PLACED, UNDER A RENTAL AGREEMENT, HIS SON
IN THE SECOND PIECE PROPERTY, AND HE IS COLLECTING THE
RENT ON IT.
SO EFFECTIVELY, YOUR ORDER DISPOSSESSES HER
OF THE HOME SHE'S LIVING IN AND EFFECTIVELY GRANTS HIM
THE POSSESSION OF BOTH PIECES OF PROPERTY, TWO HOMES.
SO WE HAVE THE LUDICROUS SITUATION OF A WOMAN
WHO EARNS A POVERTY LEVEL WAGE, WHO HAS NO PLACE TO GO,
AND WHO HAS AN EQUITY IN TWO SEPARATE PIECES OF
PROPERTY; AND THE HUSBAND WINDS UP WITH BOTH PIECES OF
PROPERTY WHILE SHE'S EFFECTIVELY PUT OUT ON THE STREET.
THE COURT:

I'LL LET YOU HAVE AN

OPPORTUNITY—
MR. RICHMAM:
MR. SPAFFORD:
THE COURT:

LET ME MAKE AN OBSERVATION.
MAY I FINISH.
LET HIM FINISH.

Page 25

Q.

SO, THEY WOULD BE PUT OUT OF THE HOME ALSO?

A.

THEY WOULD BE PUT OUT OF THE HOME ALSO,

SIR
MR. SPAFFORD:

THAT'S ALL, YOUR HONOR.

I

SUBMIT IT.
THE COURT:
MR. RICHMAN:

OKAY.

NOW--

WELL, YOUR HONOR, THIS IS WHY

I HAVE A LITTLE DIFFICULTY WITH MR. SPAFFORD.

THAT WAS

FAR BEYOND A PROFFER
THE COURT:
MR. RICHMAN:
THE COURT:
MR. RICHMAN:

LET'S GO AHEAD
LET ME FINISH.
I CAN SORT THIS ALL OUT.
I DON'T THINK SO, BECAUSE THE

COURT COMMENTED ABOUT WHAT HE SAID AS IF THAT IS A
FACTUAL MATTER.
THE COURT:
TIME HERE.

WE'RE GOING TO WASTE A LOT OF

I CAN SORT THIS OUT.

I TOLD YOU IN THE

FIRST INSTANCE I'M INCLINED TO HAVE HER MOVE OUT OF THE
HOUSE.

THEY HAVEN'T SHOWN ME ANY REASON WHY SHE

SHOULDN'T BE OUT.

SO, I'M NOT CONVINCED THAT THE FACT

THAT SHE HASN'T ANY PLACE TO GO IS A REASON THAT I
SHOULD NOT ENFORCE THE ORDER.
MR. RICHMAN:
THE COURT:

SO, YOU K N O W -

MAY I MAKE PROFFER?
GO AHEAD AND MAKE A PROFFER.

LIKE I SAID, I WOULD GIVE YOU THE SAME OPPORTUNITY.

Page 42

THE COURT:
MR. RICHMAN:

LOOK M R . —
IN THE FUTURE.

WHAT IS DONE

IS DONE.
THE COURT:

IF YOU FOLLOW THE RULES OF

PROPER PRACTICE— AND AS I SAY AGAIN, I'M NOT TRYING
THE ATTORNEYS HERE TODAY, BUT I'M GOING TO ORDER THAT
SHE VACATE THE HOUSE.

THAT IS GOING TO BE THE ORDER.

SHE WILL VACATE IT WITHIN TEN DAYS, AND IF SHE DOESN'T
VACATE WITHIN 10 DAYS, THEN THE COURT WILL CITE HER FOR
CONTEMPT.
AND THAT DOESN'T MEAN MR. GUM IS GOING TO
TAKE IT OVER AND LIVE IN IT.
SOLD IMMEDIATELY.
HIGH.

THAT HOUSE HAS GOT TO BE

IF IT HASN'T SOLD, THE PRICE IS TOO

SOMETHING IS THE MATTER.

SO, HE'S NOT GOING TO

TAKE IT AMD BE IN THE SAME POSITION THAT SHE'S IS, TO
LIVE IN THE HOUSE AND NOT GET IT SOLD.

THE HOUSE IS

GOING TO BE SOLD.
AND SO, THEREFORE, WHEN YOU MOVE IN, OR SHE
REMAINS, THAT'S UP TO YOU TWO YOU TO DECIDE, THE HOUSE
HAS TO BE PLACED IN A CONDITION SO IT CAN BE SOLD AND
THE PROCEEDS WE'LL TAKE CARE OF AT A SUBSEQUENT DATE.
BUT SHE HAS TEN DAYS TO GET MOVED, AND YOU
HAVE TEN DAYS TO GET THE HOUSE IN SHAPE SO IT CAN BE
SOLD.

SO, THEREFORE, I DON'T THINK IT WOULD BE WISE

FOR YOU TO MOVE INTO IT IF YOU'RE ONLY GOING TO LIVE

Page 44

SAME PROBLEM WE HAVE HERE TODAY.
PARTIES WILL NOT COOPERATE.

AND I CAN SEE THE

SO I'M NOT GOING TO TREAT

HIM ANY DIFFERENTLY THAN I'M TREATING HER.

HE CAN TAKE

POSSESSION.
AND IF YOU NEED MORE THAN TEN DAYS TO GET IT
IN CONDITION, FINE.

BUT THERE IS NO NEED TO BE MOVING

INTO IT BECAUSE YOU'RE GOING TO BE OUT OF IT SHORTLY
THEREAFTER.
MR. RICHMAN:

I'M TOLD, AND MAYBE IT'S

INCORRECT, BUT I'M TOLD BY REALTORS THAT HOUSES

SELL

BETTER WHEN THEY'RE OCCUPIED.
THE COURT:

IN THIS PARTICULAR CASE, AS I SEE

IT, AND I AGREE WITH YOU-- I AGREE WITH YOU, BUT THERE
IS NO NEED OF US BEING BACK IN ANOTHER

2 0 OR 60 DAYS.

SO, YOU JUST 3ETT5R MAKE YOUR 3EST EFFORTS TO GET THE
HOUSE IN CONDITION AND GET IT SOLD AND RESOLVE THIS
PROBLEM.

THAT'S WHAT I SEE IS GOING TO BE DONE.
MR. RICHMAN:

HE HAS FAITHFULLY PAID THE

MORTGAGE AS PART OF THE ORDER.

I PROFFER TO YOU THAT

HE HAS FAITHFULLY PAID CHILD SUPPORT.
THE COURT:
MR. RICHMAN:

I'M

GIVING—

IT SEEMS TO ME THAT WE'RE

PUNISHING HIM FOR HER ACTS.

HE COULD HAVE HAD THE

OPPORTUNITY TO GET IT READY-THE COURT:

OKAY.

DO YOU NEED 30 DAYS TO

Page 54

$375.
2

SHE IS WILLING TO RECEIVE IT, BUT NOT AS A FINAL

SETTLEMENT.
THE COURT:

3

NO, IT IS NOT A FINAL

4

SETTLEMENT.

HE'S JUST SAYING THAT SHE'S ENTITLED TO

5

X-NUMBER OF DOLLARS PER THEIR AGREEMENT.

6

NOT SATISFIED WITH THAT AFTER LOOKING AT THE TAX

7

RETURNS, COME DOWN HERE.

3

YOUR CLIENTS.

9

SHOW-- MR. RICHMAII WILL SHOW YOU WHAT HE WOULD HAVE

AND IF YOU'RE

YOU DON'T EVEN NEED TO BRING

JUST BRING THE TAX RETURN AND YOU CAN

10

RECEIVED HAD HE NOT FILED JOINTLY.

11

HE'S PICKING UP THREE OR FOUR HUNDRED DOLLARS WHICH

12

HE'S WILLING TO GIVE HER HALF.

13
14

MR. RICHMAM:

HE'S WILLING TO GIVE HER

ALL.

15
16

NO.

THE COURT:

OH.

ALL, ALL OF IT.

MR. SPAFFORD:

18

DON'T HAVE ANY PROBLEM WITH THAT.

20

THE COURT:

MR. RICHMAN:

22

THE COURT:

24
25

THAT'S WHAT THE CONFUSION IS.

YOU PREPARE THE ORDER,

MR. RICHMAN.

21

23

THAT'S

FINE.

17

19

BY FILING JOINTLY

I AM.
MR. SPAFFORD, YOU CAN APPROVE IT

AS TO FORM.
NOW, LET ME TELL YOU, IF SHE'S NOT OUT IN TEN
DAYS, I WILL TAKE THE ACTION THAT I HAVE TO TAKE.

AND

Page 55

IF HE'S NOT OUT IN 30 D A Y S —
MR. SPAFFORD:
THE COURT:

SAME THING.
SAME THING.

MR. RICHMAN:

COULD WE HAVE AN ORDER THAT

THERE BE NO DAMAGE DONE TO THE HOUSE?.
THE COURT:

ABSOLUTELY.

THE HOUSE WILL BE

LEFT IN AS GOOD A CONDITION AS IT IS NOW.

AND YOU'RE

NOT TO DO-- AND NEITHER PARTY WILL IN ANY WAY DIMINISH
THE VALUE OF THAT PROPERTY DURING THESE PROCEEDINGS
EITHER.
MR. RICHMAN:

AND ONE O T H E R -

MR. SPAFFORD:

THAT'S REASONABLE.

MR. RICHMAN:
THING.

ONE OTHER HOUSE CLEANING

ALL OF HIS FINANCIAL PAPERS, WE MADE A REQUEST

FOR THOSE.
THE COURT:

YOU'RE TO GET ALL OF THEM.

MR. RICHMAN:

WE WOULD LIKE TO HAVE THOSE

LEFT IN THE HOUSE.
IS THAT WHAT YOU WANT?
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:
IN THE HOUSE.

YES.

LEAVE ALL THE FINANCIAL PAPERS

MAKE THAT PART OF THE ORDER.

AND I WILL TELL YOU I'M GOING TO ENFORCE
THESE ORDERS.
OKAY.

SO THAT'S ALL THERE IS TO IT.
COURT'S IN RECESS.

DIVORCE

30-3-5

30-3-5. Disposition of property — Maintenance and health
care of parties and children — Court to have continuing jurisdiction — Custody and visitation —
Termination of alimony — Nonmeritorious petition for modification.
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include in it equitable orders relating to the children, property, and parties. The court shall
include the following in every decree of divorce:
(a) an order assigning responsibility for the payment of reasonable and
necessary medical and dental expenses of the dependent children; and
(b) if coverage is available at a reasonable cost, an order requiring the
purchase and maintenance of appropriate health, hospital, and dental
care insurance for the dependent children.
(2) The court may include, in an order determining child support, an order
assigning financial responsibility for all or a portion of child care expenses
incurred on behalf of the dependent children, necessitated by the employment
or training of the custodial parent. If the court determines that the circumstances are appropriate and that the dependent children would be adequately
cared for, it may include an order allowing the non-custodial parent to provide
the day care for the dependent children, necessitated by the employment or
training of the custodial parent.
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or
new orders for the support and maintenance of the parties, the custody of the
children and their support, maintenance, health, and dental care, or the distribution of the property as is reasonable and necessary.
(4) In determining visitation rights of parents, grandparents, and other
relatives, the court shall consider the welfare of the child.
(5) Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides otherwise, any order of
the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse automatically terminates upon the remarriage of that former spouse. However, if the remarriage
is annulled and found to be void ab initio, payment of alimony shall resume if
the party paying alimony is made a party to the action of annulment and his
rights are determined.
(6) Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse
terminates upon establishment by the party paying alimony that the former
spouse is residing with a person of the opposite sex. However, if it is further
established by the person receiving alimony that that relationship or association is without any sexual contact, payment of alimony shall resume.
(7) When a petition for modification of child custody or visitation provisions
of a court order is made and denied, the court may order the petitioner to pay
the reasonable attorney's fees expended by the prevailing party in that action,
if the court determines that the petition was without merit and not asserted in
good faith.
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 1212; L.
1909, ch. 109, § 4; C.L. 1917, § 3000; R.S.
1933 & C. 1943, 40-3-5; L. 1969, ch. 72, § 3;
1975, ch. 81, § 1; 1979, ch. 110, § 1; 1984, ch.
13, § 1; 1985, ch. 72, § 1; 1985, ch. 100, § 1.
Amendment Notes. — The 1985 amendment by Chapter 72 rewrote Subsection (1);

added Subsection (2); designated two undesignated paragraphs as Subsections (3) and (4);
inserted "In determining" and "the court" in
Subsection (4); redesignated former Subsections < 2) and (3) as Subsections (5) and (6); divided Subsection (5) into two sentences, substituting "However, if the remarriage" for "unless
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30-3-7. When decree becomes absolute.
The decree of divorce becomes absolute on the date it is signed by the court
and entered by the clerk in the register of actions or at the expiration of a
period of time the court may specifically designate, unless an appeal or other
proceedings for review are pending or the court, before the decree becomes
absolute, for sufficient cause otherwise orders. The court, upon application or
on its own motion for good cause shown, may waive, alter, or extend a designated period of time before the decree becomes absolute, but not to exceed six
months from the signing and entry of the decree.

30-3-8. Remarriage — When unlawful.
Neither party to a divorce proceeding which dissolves their marriage by
decree may marry any person other than the spouse from whom the divorce
was granted until it becomes absolute. If an appeal is taken, the divorce is not
absolute until after affirmance of the decree.

30-3-10.6. Payment under child support order — Judgment.
(1) Each payment or installment of child or spousal support under any child
support order, as defined by Subsection 62A-11-40M3), is, on and after the
date it is due:
(a) a judgment with the same attributes and effect of any judgment of a
district court, except as provided in Subsection (2);
(b) entitled, as a judgment, to full faith and credit in this and in any
other jurisdiction; and
(c) not subject to retroactive modification by this or any other jurisdiction, except as provided in Subsection (2).
(2) A child or spousal support payment under a child support order may be
modified with respect to any period during which a petition for modification is
pending, but only from the date notice of that petition was given to the obligee, if the obligor is the petitioner, or to the obligor, if the obligee is the
petitioner.
(3) For purposes of this section, jurisdiction" means a state or political
subdivision, a territory or possession of the United States, the District of
Columbia, and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.
(4) The judgment provided for in Subsection (l)(a), to be effective and enforceable as a lien against the real property interest of any third party relying
on the public record, shall be docketed in the district court in accordance with
Sections 78-22-1 and 62A-11-311.

SEPARATE MAINTENANCE
Section
30-4-1.
30-4-2.
30-4-3.

Action by spouse — Grounds.
Procedure — Venue.
Custody and maintenance of children — Property division and support payments.

Section
30-4-4.
30-4-5.

Restraining disposal of property.
Rights and remedies — Imprisonment of husband or wife,

30-4-1. Action by spouse — Grounds.
Whenever a resident of this state shall have deserted a spouse without good
and sufficient cause, or being of sufficient ability to provide support shall have
neglected or refused to properly provide for and suitably maintain that
spouse, or having property within this state and the spouse being a resident of
this state shall have so deserted or neglected or refused to provide such support or where a married person without that person's fault lives separate and
apart from that spouse, the district court shall, on the filing of a complaint
therefor, allot, assign, set apart and decree as alimony the use of such part of
the real and personal estate or earnings of the deserting spouse as the court
may determine in its discretion; and during the pendency of the proceedings
the court may require that deserting spouse to pay such sums for costs, expenses and attorneys, fees, and for the support of either spouse, as it shall
deem necessary and proper in the same manner as in actions for divorce.

30-4-3. Custody and maintenance of children — Property
division and support payments.
In all actions brought hereunder the court may by order or decree provide
for the care, custody and maintenance of the minor children of the parties and
may determine with which of the parties the children or any of them shall
remain; may award to either spouse possession of any of the real or personal
estate of the other spouse, and decree moneys for support of that spouse and
the support of the minor children, and provide how and when payments shall
be made, and that either spouse have a lien upon the property of the other to
secure payment of the same. Such orders and decrees may be enforced by sale
of any property of the spouse or by contempt proceedings or otherwise as may
be necessary. The court may change the allowance from time to time according to circumstances, and may terminate altogether any allowance made upon
satisfactory proof of voluntary and permanent reconciliation. Such allowance
shall, however, in every case be only during the joint lives of the husband and
wife.

30-6-2. Abuse or danger of abuse — Complaint and protective orders authorized.
Any person who has been subjected to abuse, or to whom there is a substantial likelihood of immediate danger of abuse, is entitled to file a complaint and
seek protective orders as provided by this chapter, whether or not that person
has left the residence in an effort to avoid further abuse.

30-6-4. Assistance by court clerk and county attorney —
Affidavits of impecuniosity.
(1) The offices of the court clerk and the county attorney shall provide
forms and nonlegal assistance to persons seeking to proceed under this chapter. By mutual agreement either office may be the sole provider of those
services.
(2) If the person seeking to proceed under this chapter is not represented by
an attorney, that person shall be informed of the following:
(a) the right to file an affidavit of impecuniosity, and the requirements
for such filing. Assistance with an impecunious filing shall be provided to
the plaintiff where applicable;
(b) the means available for the service of process; atid
(c) legal service organizations that may represent the plaintiff in an
action brought under this chapter.
(3) If a plaintiff has filed an affidavit of impecuniosity, no charges may be
imposed by a district court clerk or county sheriff for:
(a) filing a complaint;
(b) obtaining an ex parte protective order;
(c) obtaining copies, either certified or not certified, necessary for service or delivery to law enforcement officials; or
(d) service of the complaint, ex parte protective order, or protective
order.

Rule 52. Findings by the court.
(a) Effect In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an
advisory jury, the court shall find the facts specially and state separately its
conclusions of law thereon, and judgment shall be entered pursuant to Rule
58A; in granting or refusing interlocutory injunctions the court shall similarly set forth the findings of fact and conclusions of law which constitute the
grounds of its action. Requests for findings are not necessary for purposes of
review. Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence,
shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given
to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.
The findings of a master, to the extent that the court adopts them, shall be
considered as the findings of the court. It will be sufficient if the findings of
fact and conclusions of law are stated orally and recorded in open court following the close of the evidence or appear in an opinion or memorandum of
decision filed by the court. The trial court need not enter findings of fact and
conclusions of law in rulings on motions, except, as provided in Rule 4Kb). The
court shall, however, issue a brief written statement of the ground for its
decision on all motions granted under Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56, and 59
when the motion is based on more than one ground.
(b) Amendment. Upon motion of a party made not later than 10 days after
entry of judgment the court may amend its findings or make additional findings and may amend the judgment accordingly. The motion may be made with
a motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59. When findings of fact are made
in actions tried by the court without a jury, the question of the sufficiency of
the evidence to support the findings may thereafter be raised whether or not
the party raising the question has made in the district court an objection to
such findings or has made either a motion to amend them, a motion for judgment, or a motion for a new trial.
(c) Waiver of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Except in actions
for divorce, findings of fact and conclusions of law may be waived by the
parties to an issue of fact:
(1) by default or by failing to appear at the trial;
(2) by consent in writing, filed in the cause;
(3) by oral consent in open court, entered in the minutes.
(Amended effective Jan. 1, 1987.)

Rule 201. Judicial notice of adjudicative facts.
(a) Scope of rule. This rule governs only judicial notice of adjudicative
facts.
(b) Kinds of facts. A judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to
reasonable dispute in that it is either (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.
(c) When discretionary. A court may take judicial notice, whether requested or not.
(d) When mandatory. A court shall take judicial notice if requested by a
party and supplied with the necessary information.
(e) Opportunity to be heard. A party is entitled upon timely request to an
opportunity to be heard as to the propriety of taking judicial notice and the
tenor of the matter noticed. In the absence of prior notification, the request
may be made after judicial notice has been taken.
(f) Time of taking notice. Judicial notice may be taken at any stage of the
proceeding.
(g) Instructing jury. In a civil action or proceeding, the court shall instruct the jury to accept as conclusive any fact judicially noticed. In a criminal
case, the court shall instruct the jury that it may, but is not required to, accept
as conclusive any fact judicially noticed.

OPINIONS AND EXPERT TESTIMONY.
Rule 701. Opinion testimony by lay witnesses.
If the witness is not testifying as an expert, his testimony in the form of
opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences which are (a)
rationally based on the perception of the witness and (b) helpful to a clear
understanding of his testimony or the determination of a fact in issue.

Rule 702. Testimony by experts.
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education,
may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.
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RITA C. GUM
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
oooOooo
RITA C. GUM

:
AFFIDAVIT OF IMPECUNIOSITY

Plaintiff and Appellant,

:

vs.

:
Civil No.

JAMES RICHARD GUM

D90-4901065

:
Judge John A. Rokich

Defendant and Appellee.

:
oooOooo

I, RITA C. GUM, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that owing to
my poverty I am unable to bear the expenses of the action or legal
proceedings which I am about to commence (or the appeal which I am
about to take), and that I verily believe I am justly entitled to
the relief sought by such action, legal proceedings or appeal.

DATED this LfXk day of 6- ('T~^/^ y

, 1990.

R£TA C. GUM
Plaintiff and Appellant

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this

^ff

day of October, 1990.

DELIVERED/MAILED a copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF
IMPECUNIOSITY to the Salt Lake County Attorney's Office, 231 East
400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111; KATHY SCHULTZ, Court
Reporter, Metropolitan Hall of Justice, Salt Lake City, Utah
84111; and the Attorney General's Office, 236 State Capitol, Salt
Lake City, Utah 84114, this

Mffj&ay

of October, 1990
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, lfc AND .run
SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH
IN THE KATTSR o f t h e ADOPTION o f

)

SUSAN, CYNTHIA, AMY a n d JOY
BAILEY, m i n o r s .

|
I

A

SEP 4

1984

~ B4-jggfrN, Wm»i'fi j ^ g

DECREE OP ADOPTll
tl
kH^^S

The p e t i t i o n o f James R i c h a r d Gum f o r

t h e a d o p t i o n of t h e

a b o v e named c h i l d r e n came on t o b e h e a r d b e f o r e

Honorable

K e n n e t h R i g t r u p on A u g u s t 3 1 , 1 9 8 4 , Don L . Bybee a n d J .

Allan

C r o c k e t t a p p e a r e d on b e h a l f of t h e p a r t i e s a n d p r e s e n t e d

the

m a t t e r t o t h e c o u r t , and t h e c o u r t h a v i n g made i t s F i n d i n g s

of

F a c t and C o n c l u s i o n s of Law, w h i c h a r e i n c o r p o r a t e d h e r e i n b y
reference,

in accordance therewith,

it is

hereby

ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED:
That t h e f o u r c h i l d r e n a b o v e named, v.hose names and d a t e s
of b i r t h a r e : S u s a n , ! f e r c h l 4 , 1 9 7 0 , C y n t h i a ,
Amy, I'&rch 1 4 , 1975 a n d J o y , S e p t e m b e r 22,

October 14, 1971,

1976, a r e adopted by

J a n ' e s R i c h a r d G u m , w i t h a l l r i g h t s and d u t i e s h e v.ould h a v e t o h i s
own n a t u r a l c h i l d r e n , i n c l u d i n g t o s u p p o r t , m a i n t a i n and
them and t r e a t

educate

them i n a l l r e s p e c t s a s h i s own c h i l d r e n ; and t h e y t o

h a v e a l l of t h e p r i v e l e g e s end o b l i g a t i o n s of c h i l d r e n and
p a r e n t t o h i m ; and
T h a t t h e i r names a r e h e r e b y changed t o e a c h of
first

their

names a b o v e s t a t e d a n d t h e surname " Gum " .
Signed t h i s

tj ""day of S e p t e m b e r 1 9 8 4 .
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